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A FORUM ON THE INTERROGATION OF
THE ACCUSED 1
Irving Anolik, 2 Osmond K. Fraenkel, George H. Gaffney,4 Fred E. Inbau,5
Richard Kuh, George B. McClellan,7 Leonard P. Moore,8 Michael J.
Murphy,9 Robert E. Roulston,10 Wallace J. Stakel,n
Arthur E. Sutherland 2
THE INTERROGATION OF THE ACCUSED: ITS NEEDS AND PRACTICE"3
COMMISSIONER MICHAEL MURPHY:

The problem of the interrogation

of the accused is, to my mind, the major procedural problem we have

to face in police work in New York State today, and the Police Department is grateful to the District Attorneys' Association for affording us
this opportunity to meet with people dedicated to various aspects of law
enforcement and to discuss this crucial question.
I hope that the opinions that are forthcoming from this panel may
bear some weight, particularly in our legislative halls and in our community councils.
There is no point in telling you that crime is one of our foremost
domestic problems today. The recent review of our 1963 experience in
New York City tells us statistically what we have known from experience:
crime is mounting and mounting. The increase in major crime (the felony
crime classifications in Part 1, Federal Bureau of Investigation Reports)
in New York City in 1963, was another dismaying ten per cent.

This, ironically, is exactly the same percentage of the increase in major
crime in those categories throughout the entire country.
In the investigation of major crime, the most effective technique in the
estimation of experienced men in the field is the interrogation of persons
who can shed light ultimately on the identity of the perpetrator in the
effort to bring him to justice.
I This panel discussion, sponsored by the District Attorney's Association of the State of
New York, was held in the Astor Hotel, New York City, New York on Friday, Jan. 31,
1964. The names of the participants are listed alphabetically.
2 Assistant District Attorney, Bronx County.
3 General Counsel, Civil Liberties Union.
4 Assistant to the Commissioner, Federal Narcotic Bureau, in Charge of Enforcement.
5 Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
6 Coordinator, New York State Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials.
7 Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
8 Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
9 .Commissioner, Police Department of the City of New York.
10 Professor of Law, University of Sidney, Australia.
11 District Attorney of Genesee County.
12 Professor, Harvard Law School.
23 The discussion was divided into two parts: The Interrogation of the Accused: Its Needs
and Practice, and The Interrogation of the Accused: The Law-The Present and the Future.
The following transpired during the morning session.
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INTERROGATION OF THE ACCUSED

To arrive at the truth, it is incumbent upon the police to question the
suspect in order to obtain necessary evidence, and sometimes, even more
importantly, to exonorate him, if the evidence so warrants.
But it should be pointed out that the questioning of a suspect is not,
as is so often stated, a short cut in investigation; an easy way to wrap up
a case. It has been claimed that if we were willing to devote more energy
to the problem of investigation, we would not have the necessity for
questioning the accused. But actual experience tells us that in many
cases there can be no progress at all toward the solution without an
interrogation of the suspect.
It is important to bear in mind that the attitude of some people, and
even some well experienced people, is that the operation of the police in
this field is a struggle of the police against the community. This attitude
is wrong, it is misguided, and it aids in defeating justice.
Those of us who are in law enforcement should constantly emphasize
that the war against crime is a struggle by the police on behalf of the
community against criminal elements, against the perpetrators of crime.
Crime certainly affects the community at large. The prevention of
crime and the apprehension of the guilty requires the active cooperation
of everybody in the community. The police must be supported and must
be joined by the public. We cannot achieve, in our various communities,
a climate of law and order when there is a gap between the police and the
public they serve. I think an additional reason why discussions of this
type are important is to enable us to communicate our viewpoint so that
it may be readily observed that we are interested in only one thing; the
obtaining of the truth.
Certainly, the citizen who does not actively support the law enforcement authorities in his community, wittingly or unwittingly, serves to
defeat them and serves to aid the criminal and deprive society of the
protection it needs.
The citizen who does cooperate is certainly contributing to the moral
tone of his community.
One of the most difficult questions faced by the police, and this has
become one of increasing difficulty in the last two years, is the situation
of the police officer on patrol-how to determine the criteria for his conduct in cases that cry out for investigation. The community demands,
and is entitled to receive, as much protection as can be afforded to prevent the criminal act.
The following case, I think, is illustrative of the dilemma in which the
police find themselves. This is a very brief account of People v. Rivera
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[38 Misc. 2d 586, 238 N.Y.S.2d 620 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963)]. In
that case, a detective, at 1:30 A.M., frisked a person whom he had observed acting suspiciously in front of a bar and grill. The frisk produced
a fully loaded pistol, plus ammunition. At the trial, the court granted a
motion to suppress the evidence of the pistol and the ammunition, holding
that the lack of probable cause for an arrest made the search both unreasonable and illegal.
Similarly, in the apprehension of perpetrators of crime, the following
case is equally illustrative. People v. Brown [32 Misc. 2d 846, 225
N.Y.S.2d 157 (Queens County Ct. 1962)]. An officer, at 11:00 P.M., observed a defendant dragging a suitcase along the street. On being questioned about the suitcase, the defendant became evasive; whereupon, the
officer, in the natural course of events, took him to the station house. It
was thereafter learned that a burglary had been committed and that the
contents of the suitcase were the properly identified proceeds of the

burglary.
Upon trial, the county court dismissed the indictment for burglary,
grand larceny, and criminal receiving on the grounds of illegal search and
seizure.
These cases can be multiplied many times over. The problem they
present has become crucial. What is a police officer to do on foot patrol
in the early morning hours when he observes a man coming out of a
darkened alley? There are varying explanations that can be given. The
man may be a tenant retrieving some property which had fallen out of
his building or something that had been left inadvertently in the rear
courtyard of the building, and he is on the way back to the house. On the
other hand, he could be a burglar armed with a knife who has just injured or murdered somebody living in the house. Or he could be a thug
with a loaded gun seeking a victim.
The right of the police officer to stop and question this individual is in
doubt in our state at this time. Even if the right does exist, equally in
doubt is the authority of the officer to conduct a frisk for weapons so as
to protect himself from attack during this period of questioning.
In order to clarify this situation, and to eliminate the doubts which
exist in our courts, state legislation has been submitted authorizing police
officers upon encountering in public places those persons they reasonably
suspect of committing a serious crime, to stop them, to question them
briefly and, when there is a reasonable suspicion of danger to life or
limb, to search the person for a concealed weapon. [N.Y. Sess. Laws
1964, chs. 84-85.]
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This does not mean, as has been claimed, that officers can or will improperly intrude into the private affairs of persons. The key phrase in
this bill is "reasonably suspects"; the term "reasonable" has been frequently interpreted by the courts and presents no novel legal problem.
The basic purpose of this bill is the protection of the police officer who
encounters a suspicious person. While a moment of questioning and explaining may dispel the suspicion, the police officer must be protected
against a sudden and perhaps fatal attack.
It must also be stressed that, at most, this would be a fleeting inconvenience to the law abiding citizen while the advantages to the community are many and apparent.
These bills have been supported unanimously by the New York State
Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials, which includes the New
York State Association of Chiefs of Police, the State Sheriffs Association,
the Department I represent, the Attorney General of the State of New
York, the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, and the New
York State Temporary Commission on Crime and Investigation.
Unfortunately, most of the opposition to this proposal which has been
expressed in the past, and which will again be present at this session of
the legislature, rests on the grounds that such legislation constitutes
an invasion of privacy-the beginning of a police state. In my judgment,
however, there is no such threat, for this measure accords fully with
constitutional safeguards-the measure by which all our conduct is
guided.
As law enforcement officers in a democratic society, we are interested
vitally in protecting and furthering the civil rights of all individuals, so
that our system of government can continue to flourish.
But constitutional safeguards and standards are not designed to disarm
law enforcement and our efforts in this legislation are directed at
restoring the equitable balance between individual rights and the interests
and protection of the community. We feel that it is most important to be
permitted to detain, for limited periods, such persons as have been
described, under circumstances justifying reasonable suspicion of misconduct, in order to question them while conducting further field investigation.
Even if the authority previously asked for, such as the frisk, was
granted, the perpetrator of the burglary in the Brown case would escape
conviction. In some instances, the suspicions of the police officer, aroused
by the action of an individual in a public place, are not dispelled by the
preliminary investigation or the so-called corner questioning. It would
be of great value to law- enforcement to be able to legally take, under
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reasonable circumstances, a person, together with the property he may
have in his possession, to the station house for interrogation.
This would afford the police the opportunity to check out the story,
and to determine whether or not there should be an arrest. The period
of detention in such case would not have to be more than two hours, and
usually much less.
Essentially, this proposal is similar to that in the Uniform Arrest Act
which has been adopted in three states. We know of the opposition which
has been generated to this proposal among many community groups. But
in our judgment, the authority requested would provide us with important
and needed weapons for law enforcement and would be in accord with
constitutional standards.
Realistically, it is also clear that until such time as we have developed
some experience with the first proposal mentioned, the frisk proposal,
the climate of the legislature is not conducive to an extension of the
authority of law enforcement officers.
The opinions of the appellate courts in this state and other states, and
in the federal courts, contain many judicial determinations that the
police have abused their present authority in the area of interrogation.
I am sure that much will be said, both this morning and this afternoon, of
present controlling law and the trends that are for the future, but I would
like to make this observation: police officers are individuals seeking to
perform their duties under their oath of office. They seek the truth and
only the truth. We do not countenance, and never will, abuse of authority
in the area of interrogation. Coerced confessions or confessions obtained in
violation of individual constitutional rights are not only valueless, but
they are a disservice both to the community and to justice.
I caution you that cries of coercion and brutality are too often heard,
and in our present climate too often believed, without any basis in fact.
Too frequently, to use legal terminology, a presumption of coercion and
brutality is created and the burden of proof shifts to the police to disprove
it. This is wrong, both morally and factually.
In my own experience, confessions and admissions against interest are
obtained from suspects as a result of careful, skillful, and legal techniques,
of which the police, and the community as well, can justly be proud.
With the rapidly changing techniques and the rapidly changing legal
situation, the police have a tremendous burden of education, not only
for the new members of their departments, but for the entering recruits.
Indeed, in many respects we have to reeducate twenty-five thousand men
every time a new interpretation or new decision is handed down from the
Bench. This puts a terrific burden on keeping the system up to date. We
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do it in many ways-by in-service training, by bulletins and so forthbut we would like, we need, to see a stabilized situation.
PRo EssoR INBAU: I do not come here to visit with you in my capacity
as a criminal-law professor. I know from my own practical experience,
both as a trial lawyer and by reason of my work in the police field, that
there is an allergy toward professors on the part of people who are out on
the firing line. I prefer to represent myself to you as one who has had
experience in this area of interrogation.
I confess, and sometimes this is distasteful to my colleagues in the
teaching world, that I am police prosecution oriented. As a matter of fact,
I am kind of proud of it. I think it is a rather sad situation that at the
present time only a very few in the teaching world have any sympathy
whatsoever for the problem of the policeman and the prosecutor.
Let me turn to the important question of the impact, on the incidents
of crime, of court decisions restricting police interrogation opportunities.
I suggest that the impact is there, and that the consequences are becoming
increasingly serious. I do not have to draw upon statistics for this. As
a matter of fact, the moment you use statistics, the other fellow takes
them and weaves them into his own argument. I prefer to rest my case on
some simple logic, and it is this-as Commissioner Murphy said, most
crimes are solvable only by means of interrogating criminal suspects, and
others who may have pertinent information. Surely common sense alone
supports this proposition. For example, take the case of a man who is hit
on the head as he is walking down the street at night and rendered unconscious. His wallet is stolen. Or, consider the case of the woman dragged
in an alley at night and raped. She is subdued very quickly and has no
opportunity to obtain a good look at this individual at least so far as
purposes of identification are concerned. These are your typical big-city
crimes.
I served as Director of a scientific crime detection laboratory, and I
can testify that in practically all cases, you could bring the entire crime
detection laboratory, the entire staff, to the scene of the crime and it would
be of no avail. The perpetrator of the crime did not leave his hat with his
name in it at the scene. He has not left a footprint. You seldom get that
kind of investigative material.
What do the police normally have to go on? There is no physical
evidence in the alley and there is no physical evidence on the street where
the man was slugged. There are no fingerprints around. The only possible
way that the crime is going to be solved is for the police to seek possible
suspects, and then when they get one, sit down and question him.
Since most crimes are solvable only by this interrogation opportunity,
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whenever you get the courts restricting that interrogation opportunity,
to the extreme that they are now doing, you are going to solve fewer
crimes and you are going to catch fewer criminals. Furthermore, the
incentive to commit crime as well as the actual amount of crime is going
to increase.
So I suggest to you that the impact is there. Let me give some judicial
authority for that proposition. In his dissent in the case of Chapman v.
United States [365 U.S. 610, 619 (1961)], Mr. Justice Clarke makes a
tacit acknowledgement of this point. While Chapman was a search and
seizure case, rather than an interrogation case, Mr. Justice Clarke's
remarks are nevertheless appropriate:
Every moment of every day someone in the United States, a law enforcement officer, is faced with the problem of search and seizure.
He is anxious to obey the rules that circumscribe his conduct in this field.
It is the duty of this court to lay down those rules with such clarity and
understanding that he may be able to follow them.
For some years now the field has been muddy, but today the court makes
it a quagmire. It fashions a novel rule, supporting it with an old theory long
since overruled.
If Rabinowitz [a search and seizure case] is no longer the law, the Court
should say so.
It is disastrous to law enforcement to leave at large the inconsistent rules
laid down in these cases. It turns the wellsprings of democracy-law and
order-into a slough of frustration. It turns criminal detection into a game
of "cops and robbers."
We hear much these days of an increasing crime rate and a breakdown in
law enforcement. Some place the blame on police officers. I say there are
others that must shoulder much of that responsibility.
[Id. at 622-23 (Clarke, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).]
You do not have to be a genius to figure out who he had in mind.
Another point I was asked to address myself to was to distinguish
between the problem that faces local police officers and the problem that
faces national police officers such as the FBI.
It is fallacious to argue that the needs of the state in this area should
be no greater than that of the federal government. It is true that in the
federal system you have the McNabb-Mallory [McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449
(1957)] rule which just about outlaws police interrogations since any
confessions obtained during a period of "unnecessary delay" in arraigning
a suspect are not admissible in evidence. The argument proceeds along
the line that if the FBI does a first-rat job without interrogation, why
cannot the police in the District of Columbia? Why caniot the police in
New York comply with it?
The answer is relatively simple and obvious. The FBI and other
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national organizations are faced with an entirely different problem from
that facing local law enforcement agencies. When FBI agents are investigating a Mann Act [62 Stat. 812 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2421 (1958)] case, a Dyer Act [18 Stat. 806 (1948); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2372 (1958)] case, or even an espionage case, they can utilize effective
investigative methods without ever talking to the suspect. They can build
up an ironclad case against a criminal without his even knowing they are
on his trail. The FBI does a wonderful job and I do not mean to depreciate
what they are doing. All I am saying is that they have a different
problem; not only by reason of what I have just mentioned, but also
because they have greater manpower and a fewer number of cases to work
on. Consequently, the FBI can bring two hundred agents to New York
City from the surrounding area in a matter of a few hours to work on an
espionage case, or a kidnapping case, or any other type of offense. They
also have greater funds than prevail in local police departments.
Primarily, however, their type of case is different. They are not dealing
with the kind of case I referred to earlier; i.e., the man robbed on the
street at night, the woman raped in the alley. You cannot rely on investigative methods alone to solve crimes of that nature. You have to
question people who may have helpful information and then you have to
sit down and question the suspect when he is apprehended.
There is another aspect, too, in which this difference prevails. Commissioner Murphy and his police department have to indulge in preventive
police work. This is a responsibility that is not saddled upon the national
police groups, such as the FBI.
Whenever you are conversing with legislators and judges about police
interrogations, you should point out these differences and dispell the Musion that whatever the FBI can do, the local police should be able to do.
CoM issIoNER GEORGE

B. MCCLELLAN: I am going to talk primarily

on the "Judges' Rules."'1 4 However, before looking at the Judges' Rules,
14

JUDGES' RULES
1. When a police officer is endeavouring to discover the author of a crime, there is no
objection to his putting questions in respect thereof to any person or persons, whether suspected or not, from whom he thinks that useful information can be obtained.
2. Whenever a police officer has made up his mind to charge a person with a crime, he
should first caution such person before asking any questions or any further questions, as the
case may be.
3. Persons in custody should not be questioned without the usual caution being first administered.
4. If the prisoner wishes to volunteer any statement, the usual caution should be administered.
The caution should end with the words "be given in evidence."
S. The caution to be administered to a prisoner when he is formally charged, should therefore be in the following words:-
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we should understand clearly how they came into existence. They were
not formulated and expounded by the learned judges of law, but were
drawn up by the judges for the administrative guidance of police. The
police in England were faced with the same problem as we are today;
that is, with respect to statements made by accused persons. The rule
then was that the statements had to be voluntarily given by the accused.
This was a principle at common law, long before the Judges' Rules came
into existence, as was the practice of the police to tell the accused that he
was under no obligation to say anything. The purpose in giving this
caution was as an expediency in discharging the onus on the Crown, the
prosecution, to show that the accused knew that he did not have to say
anything, and therefore, what he did say to the police was voluntary.
The initiative for the issuing of the Judges' Rules came from
the United Kingdom police themselves. In 1882, the police of the United
Kingdom wished to include in a police code their own rules for correct
behavior and conduct, and Mr. Justice Hawkins, a distinguished criminal
judge of the time, was invited to write a forward to their police code.
In the forward, he covered a number of points by way of advice to the
police, which are now covered by the Judges' Rules.
After the turn of the century, the Chief Constable of Birmingham asked
the Lord Chief Justice of England to give advice on the administering of
the caution to the accused person. The Chief Constable was complaining
of the inconsistency of the judges-a complaint which does not seem to
have changed too much down through the years. He pointed out that one
judge had criticized a constable for using the caution, and another judge
in the same circumstances had criticized a constable for not using it.
"Do you wish to say anything in answer to the charge? You are not obliged to say
anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say will be taken down in writing
and may be given in evidence."
Care should be taken to avoid any suggestion that his answers can only be used in evidence
against him, as this may prevent an innocent person making a statement which might assist
to clear him of the charge.
6. A statement made by a prisoner before there is time to caution him is not rendered
inadmissible in evidence merely by reason of no caution having been given, but in such a
case he should be cautioned as soon as possible.
7. A prisoner making a voluntary statement must not be cross-examined, and no question
should be put to him about it except for the purpose of removing ambiguity in what he has
actually said. For instance, if he has mentioned an hour without saying whether it was
morning or evening, or has given a day of the week and day of the month which do not
agree, or has not made it clear to what individual or what place he intended to refer in some
part of his statement, he may be questioned sufficiently to clear up the point.
8. When two or more persons are charged with the same offence and statements are taken
separately from the persons charged, the police should not read the statements to the other
persons charged, but each of such persons should be furnished by the police with a copy of
such statements and nothing should be said or done by the police to invite a reply. If the
person charged desires to make a statement in reply, the usual caution should be administered.
9. Any statement made in accordance with the above rules should, whenever possible, be
taken down in writing and signed by the person making it after it has been read to him and
he has been invited to make any corrections he may wish.
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The Lord Chief Justice, together with other justices of King's Bench
Court, gave a ruling, and from time to time, as a result of other requests
which followed, the judges in 1912 formulated four rules which constituted
the original rules.
In 1918, five more rules were formulated, and these nine rules are now
what are called the Judges' Rules. These rules are not law, either in the
United Kingdom or in Canada. They are administrative directions,
the observance of which the. police authorities should enforce upon their
subordinates because statements obtained from prisoners contrary to the
spirit of these rules may be rejected as evidence by the judge presiding
at the trial.
Rule 1 says that a police officer may question anyone in endeavoring
to discover the perpetrator of a crime. This, of course, is as it should be
and our courts have recognized the right of the police to do this. We must
not forget that in the absence of specific legislation, there is nothing to
compel a person to answer the police, at least in Canada.
Rule 2 states that wherever a police officer has made up his mind to
charge a person with a crime, he must caution him. Here the question
that arises is, at what point during an interrogation should a warning
be given. It may be easy to generalize and say that the time is when a
police officer has made up his mind to charge the person being interrogated. As a practical matter, however, that has to be taken a little
further.
Mr. Justice Patrick Devlin of the High Court of England has pointed
out in his book, The Criminal Prosecution in England [(1958)], that
the dividing line under the rules is not expressed to be the moment when
the suspect is actually charged, but rather it is whenever a peace officer
has made up his mind to charge that person with a crime. This would
seem to mean that, in effect, whenever the evidence in the possession of
the police has become sufficiently weighty to justify the charge, the charges
for this purpose are treated as having been made, and the suspect is, therefore, treated as the accused.
Police officers may try to argue that this is not stating the rule properly,
and that the test is rather, when did the police officer make up his mind;
only the officer, of course, can supply the answer to that. This procedure
does not work in practice, however, for the courts will look at all the
evidence and decide, after assessing it, whether it was reasonable for the
officer to have concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a charge.
So it boils down not to when the officer made up his mind, but when he
should have. Therefore, if there is any indication whatsoever that the
person being interviewed may be charged, he should be warned. This is
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our general practice in the Royal Mounted Police. This is what we teach.
A very important point to be considered by police officers when conducting interrogation of persons who might later be charged and taken
into custody should be raised here. That is, whether the purpose of the
interrogation is to obtain admissible evidence, or further investigational
leads; there is a great difference between the two.
The policy which we encourage in our force is that a case is not sound
if based only on a confession by the accused. A complete investigation is
made regardless of whether the accused confesses. We emphasize that a
statement should be the beginning of an investigation and not the end. If
there is no other evidence whatsoever, but yet sound information or
weighty indications that the accused is the guilty party, any attempt to
obtain a confession must be cautiously pursued as it will be imperative to
a successful prosecution that the confession be admitted in evidence.
Rule 3 states that a person in custody should not be questioned without
being cautioned. This has always been our practice and I believe it to be
a good one.
Rule 6 is really based on the same reasoning as Rule 1; namely that
anything said before a police officer has made up his mind to lay a charge
is admissible, for a person may blurt out something incriminating himself
in a crime before there is any chance to warn him.
In advising in Rule 7, that a prisoner making a voluntary staltement
must not be cross-examined, the judges were pointing out that this could
elicit answers from a prisoner and, therefore, such answers could not be
considered voluntary. Here again the police officer must decide whether
he wants the statement for evidence or for investigational leads, or for
an admission and a subsequent plea of guilty.
If it is obvious that the accused is lying or hostile, and information
is required from him, then cross-examination can be pursued. But the
police officer should abandon any thought of proffering the statement as
evidence. He should be looking only for investigational leads which may
be substantiated by independent evidence gathered by other means.
Regarding Rule 9, that the statement should be in writing, this is a point
that has to be left to the discretion of the peace officer.
Oral statements supported by peace officers' notes are admissible in
Canada. It is not necessary to have a properly written statement by the
accused before it is admissible. Many peace officers in Canada use the
following method in taking statements-the accused is warned, asked if
he has anything to say; then nothing further is said by the peace officer,
for some time, hoping that the accused will start talking. If he does,
verbatim notes are made on what he has to say, and when he is finished,
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he is asked if he will sign it. Whether he signs it or not need not affect
the admissibility. As nothing has been said by the investigator, other
than to give the caution, little difficulty is usually experienced in having
these statements presented.
This is the soundest method, short of having the accused write out the
statement in his own words. Sometimes, of course, it is necessary to begin
asking questions and if so, questions and answers should be recorded, but
with each additional question and further conversation between the
interviewer and the interviewed, the chance of having the statement of
the accused admitted is reduced. The phrase, "will be taken down in
writing," included in the caution referred to in Rule 5, is not always used,
and is not really necessary. In fact, it has been held that to use the words
makes it obligatory that anything said must be taken down in writing.
Rule 8, which provides that an accused person should be shown the
statement given by an accomplice, was included to prevent tricks intended
to mislead an accused into confessing.
In summary, the Judges' Rules are for the purpose of guiding the
police and compliance with them will result in a better chance of any
statement being admitted in evidence. Peace officers know that as a
matter of practical police work, however, absolute adherence to the
Judges' Rules can seriously imperil the success of an investigation. Therefore, sometimes a hard choice has to be made. It is at this stage that the
educational standards of the police force and the training and the discipline
of the peace officer are tested. An old experienced senior officer in my own
force once said that rules and regulations were a guide to wise men and a
law for fools. Perhaps we might view the Judges' Rules in that light.
CoMMIssIoNER GEORGE GAFFNEY: I am in a very good position here
today, running in the caboose, to be able to claim that all the previous
speakers have stolen my material. Although it is not quite true, they have
touched upon some of the points I wanted to discuss today.
When I got the invitation to speak, my first reaction was one of
puzzlement. I wondered why the views of the federal people, or the
Bureau of Narcotics in particular, should be of interest to a group such
as yourselves. On a little more serious reflection it suddenly dawned on me
that perhaps about twenty-five per cent of all the cases on which our
agents work end up in prosecution in state courts. In pursuing the narcotic
investigations, our men very often start out with the view in mind of
prosecuting the cases in the state tribunals. Contrary to the views of
perhaps a few of the District Attorneys, they are not all the "meatball"
cases. We do take some real good ones in there. In other words, we are
not trying to use the state as a garbage disposal unit; but we do starit
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out on a number of good cases working with detectives and sheriffs, and
these cases naturally tend to end up in the state courts. We have found
that the state forums offer many advantages. These advantages, however,
are disappearing as the court decisions come down from time to time, so
that eventually, I think we will all be bound by the same rules.
I should stress right at the start, that there is a basic or a principal
difference in narcotic enforcement from the general run of other types
of crimes which the police agencies find themselves investigating. We
rely most heavily on the undercover technique in order to gather the
evidence which we hope to take into court. Usually when we get to the
point of arresting a defendant, we really feel that we have him,, for all
practical purposes, sewed up as far as evidence is concerned. But nevertheless, we do have an abiding interest in questioning people. Strange
as it may seem, we are not looking for a confession to be used as evidence
as much as we are looking for, as Commissioner McClellan remarked, that
further investigative lead.
Every single grain of heroin that is picked up on the streets of New
York, or anywhere, has such a fabulous history behind it that, if you
could successfully trace it by means of interrogation or investigation, you
would find the opium poppy fields in Turkey. So, we really find our
agents acting as con men or salesmen. Our primary purpose is to try to
get the people that we arrest to cooperate with us, to act as stool
pigeons or informers, but we prefer the word "informants."
But our object, of course, is to bring about a cooperation on the part
of the accused. We hope to find out from the accused where his plant is.
Even if we do not use that evidence against him in court, at least we
can employ it to get the narcotics off the street, and thus save numerous
people from the pain and suffering of drug addiction. The accused's
remarks can take us to the next higher step and this is our fundamental
purpose. We really do not go in too much for signed confessions. Because
of the nature of the case, we feel we have sufficient evidence when we
arrest the man and that anything we obtain beyond that really would be
gravy.
So, I would say that probably in less than ten per cent of our cases do
we even attempt to take a signed confession. On the other hand, what
we do find most valuable is spontaneous admissions; voluntary admissions made at the time of the arrest. Many of them, even though they are
negative in nature, are helpful in cross-examination, because at the
psychological moment the fellow is mentally upset and tends to say a lot
of things. In other words, the truth generally tends to come out right
at that time.
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Generally speaking, when we arrest a defendant, we do not permit the
suspect to have his lawyer present during our initial questioning. We
generally advise any lawyers who make such inquiries that they can see
their client when he is arraigned. This is done with the aim of gaining
the suspect's cooperation. If we have the lawyer present, unless he is a
really cooperative individual himself, and unless he really trusts our
ultimate motives, he certainly is going to throw a monkey wrench in the
whole operation. Consequently, as a general rule in the federal agencies,
we generally inform the counsel that as soon as the defendant is arraigned,
he can in all probability get to speak to him.
I would also say that in recent years, while the laws or the decisions
handed down by the courts have been putting handcuffs on the police
officers insofar as interrogation is concerned, we in Federal Narcotic
Enforcement have been particularly helped by the Narcotic Control Act
of 1956 [70 Stat. 572, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1401-07 (1958)]. I
know this is quite a bone of contention, but we have found that the
minimum mandatory punishments, i.e., the five-years-to-twenty-years, the
ten-years-to-forty-years for second and subsequent offenses, are leveraging
devices when you use them in an attempt to get the suspect to cooperate.
And, as I said, this law has actually made things easier for us because
what we generally do is try to convince the suspect that the only salvation
he has, the only way to keep from spending a long prison term, is to
cooperate with us. It is very effective.
Finally, as far as the business of trickery, certainly we use it. I see
nothing wrong with it. I have always been taught that what we are really
after is the truth. And as long as the methods we use are not illegal and
not brutal and if the truth comes out, we really feel that this is the paramount thing. There have been cases where we will put several defendants
in different rooms and advise one that the other has confessed and sometimes it works, and sometimes it doesn't; frankly, I see nothing wrong
with that at all.
MR. STAXEL: I have asked Professor Inbau if he will talk about the
use of scientific techniques, such as truth serum, polygraphic examination,
hypnotism, and the lie detector.
PRoFEssOR INBAU: Hypnotism, insofar as the interrogation of a suspect
is concerned is, in my judgment, valueless. I think it is also dangerous for
the police to use it or encourage its use. If a person will not confess by
using psychological techniques, he is not going to confess under hypnotism, any more than a decent woman will disrobe because a hypnotist told
her to disrobe. Furthermore, be very leery of any defense lawyer who
wants to have the accused subjected to an interrogation under hypnotism.
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The person under hypnosis will still lie if it serves his own interests.
Truth serum is also practically valueless for the purpose of interrogating
suspects. When I was with the crime detection laboratory, we conducted
a number of experiments with so-called truth serum. We used it, where
the person consented, in some criminal cases, and we found it just was
not worth the effort for the little we obtained from it. We also are aware
of instances of people who were guilty but who under the influence of
so-called truth serum still were able to protest their innocence.
Here again, I think what you find is this: if the person will confess
under truth serum, he would have confessed as a result of an ordinary
interrogation, and if an ordinary interrogation will not produce a confession, you will not obtain it with truth serum.
There is also a serious risk involved in employing truth serum. There
are many people who may be allergic to the drug. Therefore, investigators run the risk of being the defendant in a death action.
With regard to the polygraph, the so-called lie detector, I believe it
to be of great value. We employed this technique rather extensively in
Chicago. In fact, it is still being used there, and I would offer this suggestion to you: it is a valuable investigative aid if you have someone
trainedand skilled in the technique. That person does not become skilled
in the technique by going to a "school" where he will listen to some
lectures for a few weeks. The requisite skill can only be acquired, in my
judgment, by means of an extensive apprenticeship program. It takes at
least six months of intensive training before the trainee will be prepared
to make a satisfactory and reliable determination as to whether a particular individual is or is not telling the truth.
Unfortunately, most of the people administering the test, particularly
the ones you find connected with police departments, have not had
adequate training. Therefore, they are not going to be helpful in determining what should be the first objective; namely, whether the person is lying
or telling the truth. The instrument does, however, assist in inducing confessions from the guilty.
Mi . STAIEL: I think so far as the questions by the panel members are
concerned, I will select one of you and let the rest of you ask that panelist
any questions that you might have.
PROFESSOR INBAU: Commissioner McClellan, in Canada if the police
do not adhere to the Judges' Rules, and obtain a confession, is it not
true that that confession is still admissible in evidence? In other words,
it is not void merely because of some breach of the Rules?
COMMISSIONER McCLELLAw: No. The whole basis on which the
Judges' Rules rests is whether or not the confession was a voluntary one.
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If the Judges' Rules have not been followed in their entirety but the
breach is not sufficient to exclude it as being involuntary, the confession
will normally be admitted into evidence.
MR. STAKEL:

Do you have any questions of Commissioner McClellan,

Commissioner Murphy?
CommssioNmE Mumip : Commissioner, you are generally familiar
with our problem in the field of interrogation and our practices; would
you regard the Judges' Rules on administering a caution more restrictive
than those in the United States and thus that they impede the police in
questioning?
CommssIoNER McCLELLAN:

No, I do not think so. Any policeman

naturally wants to have a successful case. Therefore, he chafes a bit at any
restrictions which are laid on him. But I think that even without the
Judges' Rules there is sufficient case law so that a policeman would be
most unwise to try and operate without adhering to the principle of the
Judges' Rules.
COmmSSIONER MmUE-Y: In your experience, do most prisoners remain
silent after you administer the caution?
CommissoNm McCLELLAN: I find that a little hard to answer. Certainly the experienced ones do not need the caution to start with. I think
the man that you really are trying to protect, the man you really must
protect, is the first offender. I know that in many cases the minute you
start giving the caution to an experienced criminal, he says: "I know, I
know," and he recites the caution before you can finish reading it. He
knows it by heart, and for practical purposes, I do not think it matters
whether you give it to him or not. He is not going to talk anyhow;
certainly not until he has seen his lawyer and with that type of criminal,
to all intents and purposes, we do not even worry about the possibility
of an admissible statement.
Sure, we will interrogate him, and if he knows we've got him, then in
an effort to lighten the burden on himself, he may come forward with
something which is useful, he may lead you to something you want to
find, or he may tell a story about his colleagues. But at this stage you
have given up any hope of a confession. I do not think the caution means
a thing to him. It is a mechanical thing so far as the hardened criminal is
concerned. It is certainly a necessary safeguard to the inexperienced
person who is up for the first time.
MR. STAXEL: Commissioner McClellan, would you like to ask Commissioner Murphy any questions?
COmMISSiONER McCLELLAN:

Yes. I would just like to clear one thing

in my mind about which I am not certain. Supposing you take a state-
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ment, and as a result of the information which the accused gives you in
that statement he then performs certain acts to substantiate the statement-in other words, he confesses that he has committed a robbery, and
he has hidden the loot. He takes you to where he hid it, he digs it up
for you, he produces it, he retraces his steps, he shows you exactly how
he carried out the crime. If the statement is found inadmissible, is the
other evidence also inadmissible or can it be admitted?
Com-IssIoNER MURPHY: I think that is one you had better ask Profes-

sor Inbau.
PROFESSOR INBAU: At one time the exclusionary rule, even in the states

that followed it, was not applied in situations such as the Commissioner
described, but now it is. The California Supreme Court has said there is
no difference between the two. You cannot make any derivative use of an
inadmissible confession, any more than you can make derivative use of an
illegal search and seizure. So I think the answer to the question is that it
is not usable.
CommissioNER McCLELLAN: This is, of course, not a problem for us
in Canada. I think this fact has a great bearing on the viewpoint I put
forward, because Heaven only knows what I would be able to say today if
that applied to us; but basically, our constable can go into court, and
without using the statements at all state: "On the basis of information
received on such and such a date, the accused took me to such and such
a place, and he did this and this." That is admissible.
MR. STAKEL: Are there any other questions by Commissioner Gaffney
or Professor Inbau of Commissioner Murphy?
PROFESSOR INBAU: I would like to make one point here because I have
found this to be helpful to District Attorneys and to police generally. I
have tried in the area of confessions to see if I could not come up with
some general rule so that when a policeman asks me: "what can I do
under the state of the law as it is today?" I could give him a helpful
answer. I tell the inquiring officer that the only understandable rule available is this-whenever you are about to ask a person a question or do
anything, inquire of yourself: is what I am about to say or do likely to
make an innocent man confess? If your objective answer is yes, do not do
it. On the other hand, if your objective answer is no, then go ahead and
do it. For my part, that ought to be the rule of confession admissibility.
This is not a game we are playing with criminals. The history of the confession rule discloses it was developed for the protection of the innocent
and we have come so far now with this civil liberties binge that the courts
are on, that the day is not too far off, unless there is some public resistance
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to this trend, when the police will not be permitted to question anybody
at all. Justice Douglas is on record as saying just exactly that.
Gentlemen, when the time comes that the police cannot interrogate
criminal suspects, I think I will check with Commissioner McClellan and
see what he has for me up in the woods of Saskatchewanl
MI. STAKEL: Are there any other questions by the members of the
panel to the other members, or comments before we throw it open to the
questions from the floor?
COMMISSIONER McCLELLAN: May I say one thing? I may have given
the impression that we do not in Canada put quite as much weight on the
need for a statement or a confession as you do here. If that is so, I should
explain that there probably is a reason for it. I think this is because of
the fact that other evidence seems to me, from what I have studied in the
last few weeks, to be more readily admissible in our courts than it is in
many of yours.
Now, basically, under our system, outside of confessions, evidence is
evidence, and is admissible, no matter how it was procured. If I, as a
peace officer, came into your house without a search warrant, illegally,
and if I found what I was looking for in the way of stolen goods, the
evidence that I have found is admissible. There are legal means for dealing with me for having broken the law, for having come in with a faulty
search warrant or without one. I can certainly be dealt with, either
criminally or civilly. But the illegality of the search does not basically
rule out the evidence that I have obtained as a result of an illegal act.
Therefore, in using a statement as an investigational lead, we know that
other evidence can be put in without too much difficulty, and this is perhaps one of the reasons we may not put as much weight on the statement
as you do.
CoMMISSIONER GAFFNEY: Commissioner, in line with that, I believe

that in Canada you have that tremendous document known as the Writ
of Assistance, which comes in quite handy.
COMMISSIONER

MCCLELLAN:

Only in certain cases. This Writ of As-

sistance is a warrant which is issued by a federal court to certain specified
peace officers only and we have them under two acts only: under the
Customs Act [Can. Rev. Stat. c. 58 (1952) ] and under the Narcotic Drug
Act [Can. Rev. Stat. c. 201 (1952), as amended, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 38
(1953-1954), as amended, New Crim. Code c. 748]. The Writ of Assistance permits the officer so designated to search, within certain broad
limitations, anywhere and at any itme. This I know is not used in the
United States, because remembering my history, it was one of the things
that led to the unpleasantness between George III and General Washing-
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ton. But we still have it and the only reason I think we still have it is
that we have been most careful in its use. It has been criticized. There
was a case not too long ago under the Customs Act, where there was some
criticism in the press, but it died out. But we are extremely careful to
investigate those who apply for it and to continue to police the manner
in which they use it.
CommissioNER Mupu'ny: I would like to say what I think we ought to

do is get together and then take the best features of both systems and
work together on it.
I was extremely interested in the development of the polygraph, and
I wonder if Professor Inbau could give us some examples of how it is
used; for example, as to consent, is it used on witnesses as well as suspects, and has the admissibility of a polygraph test been passed upon in
Illinois?
PRo EssoR INmAu: The court decisions up to the present time, and I

hope it remains that way through the immediate future, are to the effect
that the test results are not admissible as evidence. If someone who has
submitted to the test willingly confesses, or makes an incriminating statement, then that is usable as evidence if it meets all the other tests of
confessional admissibility. But the test results themselves, in other words,
the examiner's opinion that the subject is lying or telling the truth, is not
admissible. The only exception to that is where you may have a stipulation
between counsel prior to the test that the test will be administered by a
certain individual, and that the test results will be admissible, regardless
of which side they may favor. Some courts admit the evidence pursuant
to such a stipulation. In Chicago the test is not used on any individual
who is unwilling to submit to it. It is used, Commissioner, on both suspects and witnesses and, at least our experience has been, it has been of
tremendous assistance, not only in apprehending the guilty, but also in
exonerating the innocent; that is what a lot of people do not realize.
I could spend the rest of the afternoon telling you of case after case
where circumstantial evidence had a certain person pinned down very
thoroughly, when a skillfully administered polygraph test resulted in a
conclusion that that individual was innocent. The investigation then
proceeded further and the police picked up the person who was the guilty
one, his guilt being ascertained by the polygraph test. Consequently the
test serves a dual function-the exoneration of the innocent as well as the
apprehension of the guilty.
MR. STAIEL: Before you stop talking, would you like to say something
about the right to counsel in this area?
PRo EssoR INsAU: Yes. I know this is a burning issue with you here
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in view of what the New York Court of Appeals has been doing in the last
couple of years.
One thing that is overlooked-even by the judges themselves-is the
history in back of the constitutional provision dealing with the right to
counsel.
There is nothing in the Constitution that says a person is entitled to
counsel on the arrest level. The Constitution merely provides that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
I think this provision is stretchable, as the New York Court of Appeals
has already stretched it, to mean that the right to counsel exists wherever
the criminal prosecution begins. What is disturbing me now, and what
causes me to lose a little sleep once in a while, is the interest of at least
four judges of the United States Supreme Court in stretching the right to
counsel to the point where it means that the constitutional right to counsel
begins at the very moment an individual is arrested.
There is a case in the Supreme Court now from the Supreme Court of
Illinois, People v. Escobedo [28 Ill. 2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825, cert. granted,
375 U.S. 902 (1963)], that involves this very issue and I am scared that
the Court is going to hold that this right exists from the time of arrestif a person asks for counsel and he is not given counsel, anything you get
from him after that is to be excluded.
I think there is only one solution to this whole problem, and I am going
to offer this to Commissioner Murphy and others. I would like to see the
police of some city or state run a little experiment-announce publicly
that from henceforth on the police department is going to follow the rules
just as the courts have laid them down. In other words, the police are not
going to vary from those rules, they are not going to cheat one bit. Furthermore, let it be known that the police are not going to be responsible
for the consequences. Then try it for about three weeks. I predict that you
will have such disorder, such chaos, such a dangerous situation, that there
will be a clamor for a return to normalty and for giving the police meaningful weapons with which to fight the suspected perpetrators of crimes.
The uproar will snap the courts out of -their civil liberties binge.
MR. STAIEL:

Do any of the other members of the panel care to make

any comment? Do you want to say something about the lie detector,
Commissioner Gaffney?
ComISsioNER GAPr:Nmy: Professor Inbau mentioned that the polygraph is very helpful. I would say this: that in our work we have found
the polygraph to be particularly helpful with the really uninitiated or the
nonprofessional type that we encounter-a fellow who has not been ar-
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rested too many times in the past. We find that the psychological value
of it is particularly good.
I recall an incident, and I will not say who was involved, where a federal
agent had a very, very successful career as far as gaining confessions were
concerned with the polygraph. He made his own polygraph. He rigged up
his desk with a red light and a green light, and he had two little makeshift electrodes which he said gave a very good electro-dermal response to
the truth and to lies. He would proceed to attach one of these devices to
each thumb of the suspect. The agent would then state: "whenever you
lie, the red light will go on, and whenever you tell the truth, the green
light will go on." He would then ask the suspect a question; the answer
would be given and the agent would remark: "Uh, oh, you lied, the red
light is on." He had tremendous success.
PROFESSOR INBAU: I know of that having been used, too, particularly
in a city down South, where the police were dealing with the little less
educated type of person as a suspect.
The first question asked would be: "Have you ever cheated on your
wife?" The individual would say "no" and the red light would go on.
Then he would ask him: "Did you kill John Jones." The red light would
go on. It is psychologically effective. You can use a mimeograph machine
or anything else you want.
But I was talking about an instrument where you genuinely and skillfully make an effort to determine whether a person is lying or telling the
truth. And it can be done with a high degree of reliability.
MR. STAKEL: I will now ask if there are questions from the floor; please
identify the panelist to whom the question is directed and state your
name and your position and your'address. Yes?
VoicE: This is directed to Commissioner Murphy; since the criticism
only has been of the United States Supreme Court and of the appellate
courts, I have no reluctance to say I am Judge Geller of New York County
Supreme Court. I take it there is no criticism of the judges of the courts
below the other two.
PROFESSOR INBAU: You are pretty good fellows there.
JUDGE GELLER: I gathered that. Otherwise, I would not have gotten
up to ask the question. Commissioner Murphy, it occurred to me that since
the Judges' Rules in Canada seem to work out so effectively, would it not
be an expedient thing for New York County or for you, as the Commissioner of the Police Department in New York City, to have a body of rules
of this character, administrative rules, suggested by you for approval by
the courts? This might be very effective and could set an example for
other enforcement authorities throughout the United States?
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COMMISSIONER MURPHY: I think what you say, Judge Geller, has a
great deal of possibility in it, but I hope you are not suggesting that these
are the rules?
JuDGE GELLER: I did not. I was thinking along the lines that you might
be able to conjure up and present a good body of rules to the Judicial
Conference and perhaps something useful would come of it.
COMMISSIONER MuRPHY: I think that may well be very helpful. We

are interested in winning cases and are going to avoid conduct which we
regard as unessential to obtaining the truth or conduct which is going to
interfere with the ultimate disposition of the case.
It may well be that, as Professor Inbau indicated, there is going to
come a time when we will not be allowed to question anybody. If that
day arrives, it is going to result in more innocent people being charged
with crime than ever before. I say this because very often questioning
reveals, within a short time, that the person who is the suspect could not
possibly have committed the crime. In other words, this is a two-edged
sword and the fact that it is better be very carefully weighed by the
learned justices before any such rule is made.
PROFESSOR INBAU: May I give you an illustration of the point that
Commissioner Murphy just made? Here is a case in my own experience.
A woman was murdered as a result of a blow of some blunt instrument
over her head. She was separated from her husband and she was planning
to go to California with her daughter. The husband had set up his living
quarters in the garage, which indicates the amount of friction that was
going on between him and his wife.
The husband had no reliable explanation of his whereabouts at the
time this thing happened. He was a prime suspect. An interrogation of
the husband indicated to the investigators that he was telling the truth.
In the course of interrogation, the interrogators inquired: "Well, who
else might have been around here? It looks like someone did not break
in the house-someone probably was let into the place." He said: "Well,
there is a brother-in-law of hers who comes around once in a while." The
police picked up the brother-in-law and started questioning him. He came
up with a phoney alibi. The police pursued the questioning and he finally
admitted having killed this woman. He told the police where he had hid
the money and the jewelry he had taken from her. He also led the police
to the place where he had thrown the wrench that he used to murder her.
Had the husband not been interrogated and the investigators satisfied
with his innocence, he would have been in difficulty. How else can you
solve these crimes except by the interrogation process?
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THE INTERROGATION OF THE ACCUSED: THE LAW15
THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE

MR. KUH: The problem that will be considered this afternoon is the
current state of the law concerning interrogation. The discussion will also
cover the perplexing question of how the law should develop in view of
the need of the police for laws that do not overly restrict them in their
effort to maintain peace and order in our community. That the police,
and others, believe the present laws do not enable them to do so was
demonstrated this morning.
This morning's panel, however, consisted mostly of the police or the
law enforcement viewpoint, because they were dealing with the practice,
and the need for interrogation of persons who may be charged with crime.
This afternoon we are dealing with how the law has developed and how
it should develop.
MR. ANoLIK: Perhaps it would be appropriate, by way of background,
to observe that a confession is an express acknowledgement of guilt,
whereas an admission, which is sometimes confused with a confession, is
really a statement inconsistent with the innocence of the accused. [People
v. Bretagna, 298 N.Y. 323, 83 N.E.2d 537, cert. denied, 336 U.S. 919
(1949); see Richardson, Evidence §§ 290, 331 (8th ed. 1955).]
Historically, going back no further than the seventeenth century, the
so-called "right" against self-incrimination was not known. It was not at
all unusual to have an accused questioned not only by the trial prosecutor
but by the judge as well, without any suggestion that his rights were in
any way being invaded. Torture was not uncommon. Later on an accused
was completely precluded from testifying at a trial since it was assumed
that he would do so perjuriously. Within the last century, however, by
statute or by constitutional provision, defendants in criminal proceedings
have been permitted to testify if they wish to do so, but cannot be compelled to incriminate themselves under ordinary circumstances. [Mayers,
Shall We Amend the Fifth Amendment ch. 2.]
In one case, Palko v. Connecticut [302 U.S. 319 (1937)], Justice
Cardozo declared:
[T]he immunity from compulsory self-incrimination . . .might be lost,
and justice still done. Indeed, to-day as in the past, there are students of
our penal system who look upon the immunity as a mischief rather than a
benefit, and who would limit its scope, or destroy it altogether. No doubt
there would remain the need to give protection against torture, physical or
mental.... Justice, however, would not perish if the accused were subject
to the duty to respond to orderly inquiry. [Id. at 325-26; see Mayers, The
American Legal System 123-24 (1955).]
15 The following transpired during the afternoon session.

INTERROGATION OF THE ACCUSED

One may wonder whether it is in the interests of public safety and the
proper administration of justice to permit a person to thwart an investigation by refusing to testify when, perhaps, he is the only possible witness
to a criminal transgression.
I am going to talk primarily on what has been happening in the State
of New York. I would like to preface my remarks, however, by a quotation which is consistent with what Commissioner Murphy said this morning. The United States court of appeals, in United States v. Vita [294 F.2d
524 (2d Cir. 1961)],aptly observed:
That thorough investigation is necessary for considered and effective administration of the criminal law is a truism which has its roots in the earliest
codes of law. See, e.g., Old Testament, Deuteronomy 13:14, 19:18. It is only
in the world of fiction that investigation can be conducted impersonallythat perceptive individuals such as Sherlock Holmes and Hercule Poirot
can by some mysterious amalgam of intelligence and intuition solve the most
puzzling of crimes and bring to justice the most devious and evasive of
criminals. In the world as it is, face-to-face interrogationis the most useful
tool in the discovery and prosecution of law breakers." [Id. at 532 (emphasis added).]
I submit that there can really be very little dispute about what the
Vita case noted. Criminals, we must remember, prefer to operate as
clandestinely as possible. The average police investigation of crime, however, requires face-to-face interrogation of witnesses and suspects.
In New York, during the past decade particularly, there has been a
series of cases which have so eroded the "right" or privilege of face-to-face
interrogation that police today scarcely. dare to conduct an interview
with any suspect, in the absence of counsel, except in a very limited
sphere. Under the present New York law, a suspected culprit may not be
questioned in the absence of counsel once he has been indicted or arraigned in any court, if he has requested counsel, or if counsel asks to
see him. [People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243
N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963); People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103,
227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962); People v., Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175
N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961); People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544,
166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960); see People v. Downs, 8 N.Y.2d
860, 168 N.E.2d 710, 203 N.Y.S.2d 908, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 867
(1960).]
The pivotal case in New York seems to have been People v. Spano
[4 N.Y.2d 256, 150 N.E.2d 226, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1958), rev'd on other
grounds, 360 U.S. 315 (1959]. In Spano the defendant committed a
murder in Bronx County but fled the scene. Before he was apprehended,
he was indicted by the grand jury since an eyewitness was present when
the killing occurred.
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A few days after his indictment, Spano surrendered through an attorney. He was questioned by law enforcement officials and gave what
the New York Court of Appeals considered a voluntary statement. Subsequently, the defendant was tried and convicted of murder, first degree.
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed by a four-to-three
decision. All seven judges apparently felt that the confession was "voluntary" in the subjective or volitional sense-that is, Spano was not physically coerced into confessing. The three dissenting judges, however, believed that the fact that Spano had, on several occasions during the
interview with the police, asked his interrogators: "why don't you go see
my lawyer?" precluded the use of the confession since it was taken in the
absence of counsel. Prior to this case, the law in New York had been
fairly well-established with respect to confessions by section 395 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. ["A confession of a defendant, whether in
the course of judicial proceedings or to a private person, can be given in
evidence against him, unless made under the influence of fear produced
by threats, or unless made upon a stipulation of the district attorney,
that he shall not be prosecuted therefor; but is not sufficient to warrant
his conviction, without additional proof that the crime charged has been
committed." N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 395; see People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d
347, 179 N.E.2d 339, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1961).]
In reversing the judgment of conviction, the Supreme Court, to the
surprise of all concerned, held that in its opinion the confession was
"involuntary" under traditional standards recognized by that Court.
Shortly thereafter, however, the Court of Appeals had the opportunity
to consider the case of DiBiasi. In that case a different bench was sitting
since Chief Judge Conway had retired shortly before the case was argued.
This time, again by a four to three split, the Court of Appeals, in substance, adopted the minority rule of the Spano case. They held in DiBiasi,
therefore, that once a person is indicted, irrespective of whether he is in
custody, he may not be questioned without counsel actually present. This
meant that a person who had been indicted, although at large and being
sought as a fugitive from justice, could not even be asked his name because such a question, in the absence of counsel, could be a damaging
admission as to identity. The portent of this dilemma was apparently
brought home to the Court of Appeals in another murder case which was
argued there a couple of days after DiBiasi had been decided. This was
Downs.
In Downs the People argued that the Court of Appeals could not have
meant to so hobble and thwart criminal investigations as to preclude all
interrogation of a suspect once he had been indicted. Quite frequently,
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it was pointed out, persons under indictment are fugitives from justice,
and other law enforcement agencies such as the FBI will usually not cooperate in the apprehension of a criminal unless he is under indictment.
The Court of Appeals, without an opinion except for a one-sentencedissent by Judge Desmond, decided six to one to affirm the judgment of
conviction of Downs, although three post-indictment statements had been
received in evidence-one taken by the FBI, another by the New York
City Police, and a third by the prosecuting attorney.
'The impression of most observers, following the Downs result, was
that the DiBiasirule was limited to the situation (which also occurred in
Spano) where the defendant was actually surrendered by an attorney.
A short time thereafter, however, in Waterman the Court of Appeals
faced the problem of a post-indictment statement taken, in the absence
of counsel, from a suspect who had been indicted as "John Doe." It was
obvious that the police had to determine whether Waterman actually was
the defendant referred to in the indictment. A certain amount of questioning was clearly imperative. Waterman had been apprehended in another county on a completely different charge. With his full consent, he
spoke with a detective and identified himself as the man referred to in the
indictment and made certain incriminating admissions. This conversation
with the police was introduced into evidence.
This time, again by a four-to-three split in the court, but by a different
alignment of judges from DiBiasi,the Court of Appeals ruled that Downs
was not controlling, and that they had not meant to depart from the
"Cpurelogic," if you will, of the DiBiasiproclamation that no indicted person, not even one indicted as a "John Doe," could be questioned without
counsel actually present. Presumably an accused could not even waive
counsel.
The District Attorney argued during the Waterman case that a very
anomalous situation would be presented by the return to the DiBiasi
rule in circumstances such as Waterman. It was noted that by the simple
device of a prosecutor deliberately withholding the presentation of a case
to a grand jury until the capture of a suspect, he could take a voluntary
statement in the absence of counsel which would be admissible in evidence. Yet, if he took the identical statement in the absence of counsel
one second after indictment, it would be inadmissible. Such a result would
seem to be completely illogical. The court obviously was troubled since
three judges dissented.
At this juncture it appeared that the Court of Appeals was condemning
any interrogation of a defendant without counsel present once he had been
indicted. The indictment, it was reasoned, is the "first pleading on behalf
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of the People" [N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 274] and manifests that the
People presumably have legally sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction by a petit jury. [N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 258.] As a matter of fact,
the Constitution of the State of New York precludes trial upon any
felony without an indictment. [N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6.]
The ink on the Waterman decision was scarcely dry when Meyer was
argued. Meyer had been arraigned on a "short affidavit" as a suspect in
a robbery case. Nothing had been presented to a grand jury and the
investigation presumably was still in full bloom. I mention the fact that
the investigation was still "in full bloom" because the dissent in Spano
and the language of DiBiasiand Waterman had indicated that it was unfair to question any man after an indictment when the time "for investigation has passed." [People v. Spano, 4 N.Y.2d 256, 265, 150 N.E.2d 226,
231, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793, 800 (1958); cf. United States v. Massiak, 307
F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Murphy, 208 F. Supp. 562, 566
(N.D.N.Y. 1962).]
There does not seem to be any question but that there is no automatic
"cut-off point" at which an investigation might be deemed terminated. I
dare say that very often investigations continue up*to the point of trial
and sometimes beyond. For example, I believe in Boston recently there
was a situation where a great deal of money was spent by a prosecutor to
prove the innocence of someone accused of murder. It is fortunate that
the investigation did not terminate with the indictment.
It was felt when the Meyer case was argued, that this was clearly
distinguishable since no indictment had been returned, and as a matter
of fact there was no positive indication that an indictment would ever be.
Only a short affidavit had been filed with the criminal court. Meyer had
just been admonished of his rights by the magistrate, and as he was returning to the detention pen, he made an unsolicited voluntary statement
to the arresting officer to the effect of inquiring what the policeman
thought might happen to him if he decided to cooperate with the authorities and talk about the robbery. Meyer did not make any confession but
was looking to determine whether he could get a "break."
The detective replied that if Meyer wished he would arrange for him
to see the District Attorney. The suspect, however, merely replied that
he would let the detective know. This is all that occurred in Meyer, and
the detective testified substantially to these facts at the trial. The defendant was ultimately convicted of robbery, first degree.
Presiding Justice Botein of the Appellate Division, First Department,
in Waterman, had cogently argued against the DiBiasi rule, stating:
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Certainly, to set the fact of indictment as the absolute, artificial boundary
beyond which any statement made by an accused without benefit of counsel
becomes inadmissible is utterly unreal. To illustrate: A suspect not under
indictment could be coerced into making a confession by harsh measures
falling just short of those proscribed by the cases. His statement would be
voluntary, in the due process sense, and therefore admissible. On the other
hand, a conscience-stricken defendant named in an indictment could surrender himself, simultaneously babbling his guilt without any prodding or
questioning whatsoever; and this would be deemed an involuntary statement, and therefore inadmissible. [People v. Waterman, 12 App. Div. 2d
84, 88, 208 N.Y.S.2d 596, 599 (1960) (dissenting opinion), rev'd, 9 N.Y.2d
561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961).]
It was assumed that the Court of Appeals would not extend the exclusionary doctrine of DiBiasi and Waterman to a pre-indictment situation since obviously a criminal proceeding in a felony case could not be
deemed commenced until the finding of a true bill. Nevertheless, in Meyer
the Court of Appeals, again by a split decision-four to three-and again
by a different alignment of judges, ruled that a pre-indictment arraignment is deemed to inaugurate a criminal proceeding and, therefore, held
that no suspect in a criminal investigation could be questioned, without
counsel, once he had been arraigned even though he had not yet been
indicted. An attorney would have to be actually present.
The question posed to the Court of Appeals was whether conversations
of an innocuous nature during booking procedures of an indicted suspect,
or following an arraignment prior to indictment, would be admissible.
For example, a police officer during fingerprinting might discuss men's
fashions with a suspect and perhaps might learn that the accused owned
a green suit with white polka dots. This would seemingly be completely
irrelevant, but if at trial it should suddenly become material to determine
whether the defendant possessed such a garment, why should such a conversation be excluded? Apparently the Court of Appeals felt that the
accused required protection to the "nth degree," and consequently the
majority seemed unperturbed by the extension of the exclusionary rule.
To add to the problems, the recent cases of Donovan and Lane [10
N.Y.2d 347, 356-57, 179 N.E.2d 339, 342-43, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197, 201-02
(1960) (concurring opinion)] indicate a sentiment to engraft the prompt
arraignment requirements of the federal courts such as in the McNabb and
Mallory [McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957)] cases, on to the New York exclusionary rule.
The McNabb-Mallory rules require very prompt arraignment of any
suspect in a criminal investigation, and since arraignment in the state
court would preclude further questioning without counsel, a situation
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which does not obtain in the federal courts, it would be virtually impossible to conduct interrogation in New York altogether.
The situation was compounded even further by other decisions of the
courts. In Donovan, the Court of Appeals recently held, again by a four
to three vote, that once a suspect requests counsel even prior to arraignment or indictment, or an attorney, with or without his knowledge, requests to see him, all questioning must cease until the lawyer is allowed
to be present. This has carried the exclusionary rule in New York to an
incredible length.
It is obvious that all questioning can now be frustrated by the suspect
merely uttering the desire to have counsel, or by the family or friends of
the accused directing an attorney to call the station house. Even if there
is no request for counsel and no inquiry from counsel, a prompt arraignment requirement along the lines of McNabb-Mallory would so limit the
period of questioning that it would almost render it academic.
The dilemma caused by this is "Janus-faced," since a person who is
suspected of a crime, perhaps a sex crime, might have a perfect alibi
which would exculpate him. To verify the alibi, however, might take considerable time. The police, not wanting to violate prompt arraignment
procedures, might nevertheless cause him to be arraigned in court and
thereby publicize the fact of his arrest. This would almost certainly cause
severe harm to his reputation and perhaps dire economic consequences.
If the alibi proved true, a later retraction by the newspapers would be
small solace for the injury done to the man's reputation.
In People v. Rodriguez [11 N.Y.2d 279, 183 N.E.2d 651, 229 N.Y.S.2d
353 (1962)] the Court of Appeals declared that the decision in Mapp v.
Ohio [367 U.S. 643 (1961)], as well as the DiBiasi and Meyer cases, require that a confession which in part was promulgated by the sight of a
gun which had been unlawfully seized from the suspect's abode, although
the confession itself was entirely voluntary, must nevertheless be surpressed as a "fruit of the poisonous tree." In other words, the confession
was a product of an unlawful search.
The appellate division in People v. Corbo [17 App. Div. 2d 351, 234
N.Y.S.2d 662 (1st Dep't 1962)] turned the coin the other way and implied that where a confession is involuntary, evidence which is obtained
as a result of such confession, even though legally procured in the Mapp
sense, must, nevertheless, be surpressed as a "fruit" of the coerced confession.
If the principles of Rodriguez and Corbo are to be carried all the way,
then the authorities may desist from questioning altogether because it
would appear that it is impossible to predict how far the Court of Appeals
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would carry these exclusionary rules as exemplified in the recent skein of
cases, which progressively limit admissibility.
Thus, if the police obtained what they believed to be an admissible
confession, only to have it later ruled "unconstitutional" by the Court
of Appeals, not only would the confession become inadmissible at a later
trial, but conceivably a great deal of evidence to which it referred might
likewise have to be suppressed.
It is interesting to note that even the federal law has not gone this far.
For example, in the McNabb [McNabb v. United States, 142 F.2d 904
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 771 (1944)] case, a post-arraignment
statement was permitted into evidence in the retrial and this was held
permissible by the United States court of appeals-the Supreme Court
denying certiorari.
The Downs case is the only decision of the Court of Appeals in New
York where post-indictment statements were declared admissible into
evidence after the decision in People v. DiBiasi. It is significant that the
Supreme Court denied certiorari to Downs, as a result of which he was
ultimately executed.
In DiBiasi the Court of Appeals had indicated that they interpreted
certain portions of the United States Supreme Court's opinions in Spano
as agreeing with the dissent of the New York court that a post-indictment
statement without counsel present was a violation of a person's constitutional rights.
It is submitted that while a denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court
ordinarily is without significance, it must be deemed to have some import
in the Downs case. It does not seem conceivable that if the Supreme Court
had meant in Spano that it was unconstitutional to receive a post-indictment statement without counsel present, that they would have permitted
Downs to be electrocuted, as he ultimately was.
There would appear to be a tendency on the part of the Court of Appeals to "out-Herod Herod." This was observed in United States v. La
Vallee [206 F. Supp. 679, 680 (N.D.N.Y. 1962)] where the court noted:
I have expressed over and over that the Court of Appeals, New York, always follows without reluctance and will usually go beyond in a liberal extension the new interpretations of the United States in matters involving
violations of federal constitutional rights in state criminal prosecutions.
[Emphasis added.]
It is ironic to note that a majority of the Court of Appeals has recognized
that a voluntary confession "is the most acceptable and reliable evidence
of guilt, superior in reliability, because of its source and because it is a
direct acknowledgement of guilt, to any direct or circumstantial evidence
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of guilt from other sources." [People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d 347, 358, 179
N.E.2d 339, 343, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197, 203 (1961).]
The majority of the Court of Appeals has recognized and has recently
reiterated its long standing opinion that "voluntariness is logically and
traditionally the only test" for determining the admissibility of a confession. [People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d 347, 358, 179 N.E.2d 339, 343, 223
N.Y.S.2d 197, 203 (1961).]
It is, nevertheless, quite paradoxical that in the cases of DiBiasi,Waterman, Meyer, Donovan, and several others, ,the confessions were unquestionably and undeniably "voluntary." In such cases as Lane and People
v. Everett [10 N.Y.2d 500, 180 N.E.2d 556, 225 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1962)],
on the other hand, where the Court of Appeals indicated the statements
were admissible, there was a very serious question whether the-statements
were voluntary. The analogue of Justice Botein in Waterman, therefore,
would seem to have been quite prescient.
The one distinguishing feature of Downs is that the prosecutor, prior
to taking Downs' statement, admonished the defendant that if he wanted
to call a lawyer he was free to do so. Downs declined the offer. The Court
of Appeals, however, noted in attempting to distinguish the Downs case,
that there the defendant had taken the stand and had admitted substantially everything that was testified to by the prosecution. But I
suggest that this could not have been the controlling reason for the decision affirming Downs' conviction; otherwise confessions should be admitted into evidence subject to being stricken if the defendant fails to
take the stand. Moreover, it was quite apparent that Downs probably
was compelled to testify in order to explain away the confessions.
Therefore, it is submitted that the situation in New York with respect
to the interrogation of suspects is far more limited than that which obtains
in federal jurisdictions. It must be kept in mind, moreover, that metropolitan police forces in big cities like New York have problems which are
not ordinarily encountered by the FBI.
In the case of Watts v. Indiana [338 U.S. 49, 61-62 (1949) (concurring
opinion) ] Mr. Justice Jackson correctly recognized that counsel for a
defendant ordinarily conceives his sole duty to be to keep his client out of
jail. Such counsel usually feels no obligation to help society solve its crime
problem. Thus, it is manifest that to have defense counsel present during
an interrogation is tantamount to rendering it completely useless since
most counsel would undoubtedly admonish their clients to remain silent.
[Anolik, "The Law of Confessions and the Attrition of the Right of Face
to Face Interrogation of Suspects in Criminal Cases," 149 N.Y.L.J. Nos.
123-25, p. 4, col. 1 (1963).]
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PROFESSOR SUTHERLAND:

I do not come as a missionary, or as someone

carrying a torch. I think perhaps the most useful thing I could do for a
few minutes today, is to comment on some of the things which Professor
Inbau and Commissioner Murphy said. As Professor Inbau put it, the
courts have recently been on a "civil liberties binge" and, as Commissioner Murphy asked, whether it would really be possible after such
rulings to carry on the administration of police affairs.
Now, I do not know that I would use the same phraseology, but I would
agree that the federal and state courts in the last half-a-dozen years have
handed down a series of decisions which deeply affect the interrogation of
people in police and prosecutorial custody. In general, I would agree that
these decisions have affected what had been the law of prosecution, in a
manner adverse to what a good many police and prosecutors think desirable.
I concur to this extent with Professor Inbau and with Commissioner
Murphy. If you will permit, I shall do the not very risky thing of outlining what the Supreme Court of the United States has done in the last
half a dozen years, and then briefly project where I think they may be
going to go in the near future. This is even less risky, because nobody can
say I am wrong.
As Mr. Anolik suggested, the story may well begin with the McNabb
boys of 1943 [McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)]; the
"McNabb Doctrine" is today's "Mallory Doctrine" [Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957)]. In 1957, the Supreme Court of the United
States decided Mallory, which, of course, governs only proceedings in
federal courts. I do not quite agree with the view that the federal courts
have no concern with ordinary common-law crimes of violence in large
cities, because one should not forget the District of Columbia. That is
where Mallory established his reputation. Mallory was a rapist. He was
ultimately convicted of committing a horrible rape, but when he was
first taken into custody nobody could find any sure proof against him.
Proof was obtained by adroit use of a lie detector and by some questioning. Eventually Mallory confessed. Then the Supreme Court of the United
States held that under Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure he had been detained during this interrogation longer than was
necessary to take him before a judicial officer-a commissioner or a judge
-and therefore his confession was not admissible in evidence; consequently his conviction and sentence of death were reversed. Ultimately,
he was turned loose. I regret to say that he committed a similar offense in
Philadelphia, where, as a result of that subsequent rape, he is now a guest
of the State of Pennsylvania, I trust for an indefinite time.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 49

Mallory of 1957 should be bracked with Griffin v. Illinois of 1956
[351 U.S. 12 (1956)]. We have seen the Supreme Court of the United
States making rather difficult an interrogation by federal officers without
the presence of counsel, before the warning which goes with being taken
before a United States Commissioner. Now, what has the Supreme Court
of the United States done about interrogation by state officers, and the
use of their results in state court prosecutions? I think this story begins
in Illinois in 1956, the year before Mallory. The Supreme Court in Griffin
held that Illinois must make available to a man who is poor the same
facilities, such as a trial transcript, for his defense that it gives to a man
who has some money. Today this is a rather difficult proposition to call
wrong. I agree with the decision. It is not easy, in these United States, to
say that a poor man shall stand less well before the bar of justice than a
rich man.
The next state case that I think ought to be mentioned has already been
discussed by Mr. Anolik. That's Spano v. New York [360 U.S. 315
(1959)]. All of you know Spano thoroughly. I merely want to mention
one feature of the case, which seems to have impressed the Supreme Court.
The interrogation which resulted in the Spano reversal occurred between
a policeman with a provisional appointment (probationary appointment)
and Spano. Spano was in police custody. He and the probationer were
one-time friends; the probationary policeman talked to Spano for a while
in an effort to obtain a confession and Spano kept saying: "I want to see
my lawyer, I want to see my lawyer," and the probationer would go out
and so report. His superiors would say to him: "Tell Spano that your
wife is pregnant and you are going to lose your job." That was not true,
he was not going to lose his job. Anyway the probationer said to Spano:
"They are going to fire me. Confess." After he had said it a few times,
Spano said: "I will tell all. I did shoot him." Incidentally, Spano had
shot the dead man in a room full of people, so I gather that availability
of other witnesses was not entirely out of the question.
The Supreme Court of the United States mentioned this deception
played upon Spano, and the fact that the police would not call Spano's
lawyer although he asked for him; the Court pointed out that the conversation was incommunicado and reversed Spano's conviction. Those of
you who may feel that I am preaching a sermon, or carrying a torch here,
will please take notice that I disclaim this. I am merely reciting what is
to be read by any of you in the 360th volume of the United States Reports at page 315.
Now we come down to Rodgers v. Richmond [365 U.S. 534 (1961)],
a Connecticut case decided by the Supreme Court in 1961..There is a

19641

INTERROGATION OF THE ACCUSED

perennial question in confession cases, as to whether a demonstration of
truth eliminates the criticism of a confession obtained by methods with
which the Court does not agree. In Rodgers the Supreme Court, in the
prevailing opinion, said that the object of the exclusionary rule is not
necessarily to demonstrate that the confession was not true. Rather, the
object of the exclusionary rule is to control the means by which the confession was obtained. This has a bearing on Professor Inbau's statement
this morning that his governing principle would be to advise any police
officer conducting an interrogation to ask a suspect those questions that
he believes will produce the truth. Do not, said Professor Inbau, ask him
the question if you think it will not produce the truth.
I am reading now from the prevailing opinion in Rodgers v. Richmond:
"The attention of the trial judge should have been focused, for purposes
of the Federal Constitution, on the question of whether the behavior of
the state's law enforcement officials was such as to overbear petitioner's
will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined-a
question to be answered with complete disregard of whether or not the
petitioner in fact spoke the truth." [Id. at 544.]
I am not saying that the Supreme Court is right or wrong in what it
said in Rodgers. I am interested in what that Court has said and what it
has decided, not how sad we may or may not feel about it.
I should mention one more 1961 decision. This was Mapp v. Ohio [367
U.S. 643 (1961)] where the exclusionary doctrine of Weeks v. United
States [232 U.S. 383 (1914)] was applied to state prosecutions. It belongs in this list of cases in which one sees always a tendency in one direction. Following Rodgers and Mapp one can jump down to 1963 where
there was a series of decisions which I think have a great importance to
us, and they are again all moving in one direction. One of these, decided
last spring, is Gideon v. Wainwright [372 U.S. 335 (1963)] which held
that in a state court, even in a noncapital case, it is a denial of due
process of law to try a man without providing him with counsel; free
counsel must be provided if the accused lacks money enough to pay
counsel. Gideon is a natural protraction of Griffin.
How far Gideon goes, I do not know. The last time Professor Inbau
and I were together, we both spoke to the Association of State Chief
Justices at the American Bar Association last August. I was subjected to
cross-examination that day as to how far down toward the drunk and
pickpocket in police court the constitutional obligation to supply free
counsel went; I was obliged to take refuge in my privilege against selfincrimination. I kept saying: "I do not know, I do not know, I do not
know."
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White v. Maryland [373 U.S. 59 (1963)], also decided last spring, is
another in this series. It was a capital case. There the Supreme Court held
that a suspect, if first brought before a state judicial officer, even for a
moment, if a lawyer is not provided for him, no plea that he makes before
the judge may later be used against him as an admission. [In New York
a plea may be withdrawn and is not thereafter usable as an admission.
People v. Spitaleri, 9 N.Y.2d 168, 173 N.E.2d 35, 212 N.Y.S.2d 53
(1961).]
Where does this all lead? Today we are in conference about interrogation under detention. Where is the law moving in this respect? When a
person is held by police for ten minutes, a half hour, two hours, six hours,
out of contact with his lawyer, put through the process of interrogation
resulting in a confession, is he subject to having his confession used?
What if no statement is made to him that he is entitled to a lawyer if he
is entitled to one? This is, I think, the next great question that we face.
At the risk of tiring you out, I repeat that I am here, for the moment, to
make the best guess I can as to the direction in which the law is going.
In People v. Donovan [13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d
841 (1963)] last October, to which Mr. Anolik referred, Judge Stanley
Fuld said some very significant things; remember that this was a case
involving substantially the situation I have just discussed. The following
is from the prevailing opinion in the New York Court of Appeals:
It needs no extensive discussion to establish the high place which the
privilege against self-incrimination enjoys in our free society. The right of
an accused to counsel as a procedural safeguard in our system of government, enjoys equal eminence. . . . In the case before us, these rights and
privileges converge, for one of the most important protections which counsel can confer while his client is being detained by the authorities is to preserve his client's privilege against self-incrimination and prevent the deprivation of that and other rights which may ensue from such detention.
It would be highly incongruous if our system of justice permitted the
district attorney, the lawyer representing the state, to extract a confession
from the accused while his own lawyer, seeking to speak with him, was
kept from him by the police. [Id. at 151-52, 193 N.E.2d at 629, 243
N.Y.S.2d at 843.]
Last September 17, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit, in an opinion by Circuit Judge John Minor Wisdom, discussed a
very similar problem. Unlike Donovan,Lee v. United States [322 F.2d 770
(5th Cir. 1963)] concerned a confession obtained after indictment; otherwise the facts are much the same. The Fifth Circuit reversed Lee's conviction because it was obtained without providing a lawyer for him; the
language of the opinion is significant:
[W] e base our decision on the error of the trial judge in not excluding the
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testimony of a special government investigator relating to alleged admissions
of the defendant during an ex parte police interrogation.
The basic difficulty this case presents arises from the conflict between
society's interest in police interrogation of suspected criminals and the
protection of an individual's constitutional rights during such an interrogation. There is general agreement among criminologists that interrogation of
criminal offenders is a necessary ingredient of police activities. There is also
no doubt that a police interrogation of a defendant in secrecy, or at least
in privacy, is more effective than interrogation in the presence of the defendant's lawyer. But the Sixth Amendment states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence." The Supreme Court has construed the Amendment to mean
that in federal courts a defendant has an absolute right to counsel, and
counsel must be provided for defepdants unable to employ counsel, unless
the right is competently and intelligently waived. Johnson v. Zerbst, 1938,
304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461. Moreover, the Supreme
Court now holds that this right is so fundamental to a fair trial and to due
process of law that it is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 1963, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9
L. Ed. 2d 799.
The Sixth Amendment speaks of "Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
Giving this clause a narrow construction, the right might be construed to
begin at the time of trial. In 1932 Mr. Justice Sutherland, in the Scottsboro Cases, repudiated any such narrow view; "[A defendant] requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step of the proceedings against him."
Powell v. Alabama, 1932, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S. Ct. 55, 64, 77 L. Ed. 158.
In view of Justice Warren's dissent in Crooker [Crooker v. California,357
U.S. 433 (1958)] and .icenia [Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958)]
and the concurring opinions of Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and
Stewart in Spano, it now appears that a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court recognize the constitutional right to counsel during police interrogation in cases involving prosecutions by the State. [Lee v. United
States, 322 F.2d 770, 772-73, 775 (5th Cir. 1963) (emphasis in original;
footnotes of the court omitted; some brackets in original).]
Now, I come down to this final thought. Suppose a man without money
does not know enough to say: "I want my lawyer, I want my lawyer, I
want my lawyer," so as to raise a Donovan situation. Is the Supreme Court
going to hold that it is the obligation of the policeman to say to him:
"Mr. Accused, I am obliged to advise you that you are entitled to consult
with a lawyer as to your rights, and that you are entitled to a lawyer at
public expense, because if you had money enough to hire one and one was
knocking on the door, under the Donovan case we would be obliged to let
him talk to you." That will be the next big question.
There has been a good deal of discussion of the Judges' Rules in England. Last week they were amended. The new Judges' Rules took effect
last Monday. I have here a photocopy of the London Times for Saturday,
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January 25, 1964. There is not much change in the rules. They specify
what the "warning" should be. They set the "warning" out in so many
words:
II. As soon as a police officer has evidence which would afford reasonable
grounds for suspecting that a person has committed an offence, he shall
caution that person or cause him to be cautioned before putting to him any
questions, or further questions, relating to that offence.
The caution shall be in the following terms: "You are not obliged to say
anything unless you wish to do so, but what you say may be put into writing
and given in evidence."
When after being cautioned a person is being questioned, or elects to
make a statement, a record shall be kept of the time and place at which any
such questioning or statement began and ended and of the persons present.
A thing that particularly interests me about today's discussion occurs
in the introduction to the new Rules, announced by the Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Ashworth, Mr. Justice Paull, and Mr. Justice Widgery.
INTRODUCTION

These Rules did not affect the principles
(a) that citizens had a duty to help a police officer to discover and apprehend offenders;
(b) that police officers, otherwise than by arrest, could not compel any
person against his will to come to or remain in any police station;
(c) that every person at any stage of an investigation should be able to
communicate and consult privately with a solicitor. This was so even if he
were in custody provided that in such a case no unreasonable delay or
hindrance was caused to the processes of investigation or the administration
of justice by his doing so ....
Is New York adopting this position? I should not be surprised if it were;
I cannot share Professor Inbau's concern that if the time ever comes when
the police are forced to abide by the above rules we should "be scared
to death"; my reaction is just the opposite; if the police are not compelled
to play by the above rules, I think we all have reason for grave concern.
This morning Commissioner McClellan's words about the Royal Canadian Mounted Police made a deep impression on me. I have been much
impressed by what I have seen of British and Canadian police in action.
I have been very much impressed by the fact that in England and in
Canada, the police generally say they are "our" police; they are not
"their" police. "The police," our British friends say, "are our police, they
are our people. We are proud of them."
The problems that we are dealing with here today are going to be
solved in the last analysis, not by any little change of rules this way or
that-the Judges' Rules or the Supreme Court rules or statutory rules in
Albany. Ultimately the problems we are here discussing are going to be
solved when the people of New York and Massachusetts and Illinois and
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California feel that the police are "our" police; that they have our ideals,
that they are here to administer the law which favors the accused as conscientiously and as earnestly as that which goes against the accused. When
the people believe in their truthfulness, believe they are not tricksters, believe that they are honest with everybody, with all citizens then the
problems about which we have been talking will be much nearer solution
than they are today.
MR. FRAENKEL: I take a somewhat more jaundiced a view of things
and have perhaps an axe to grind on the libertarian side. There is no
doubt, as Professor Sutherland pointed out, that there has been something of a minor revolution in the relation of the courts towards police
and prosceutors. I suggest that, as this last remark indicated, this revolution was caused to a considerable extent by a feeling that the police and
the prosecutors needed some chastisement. Perhaps the swing has gone
too far. But that it was long overdue, I think is fairly clear. A cursory
perusal of the host of Supreme Court decisions in the field of confessions
and other aspects of due process reveals that there have been abuses by
police and by prosecutors.
I need only mention the case with which I was very closely connected,
the Leyra [Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954)] case. In that case a
man was suspected of having murdered both his parents, and he was
asked to come to the police station, which he did, and was questioned. In
the course of the questioning, when it appeared that he had a sinus condition, he was told that a doctor would be asked to come and help him for
the sinus condition. The police and the prosecutor both (not the present
prosecutor of Kings County, I should say, but his predecessor) sent a
psychiatrist, not a doctor, into a wired room to treat the suspect for his
sinus ailment. The psychiatrist labored with him for an hour and a half
to soften him up. He succeeded, and a confession resulted.
After many legal proceedings, the case ultimately got to the Supreme
Court of the United States which held that the confession to the District
Attorney, which followed the improper questioning by the psychiatrist,
was a denial of the suspect's constitutional rights. Such deplorable practices, though pretty generally abandoned today, resemble the old third
degree, which resulted in decisions such as Chambers v. Florida [309
U.S. 227 (1940)]. So there was a reason, I suggest, which brought about
this shift in the attitude of the courts. I should point perhaps in that
connection to a case which I just read in the advance sheets this morning.
It was a Fourth Department case involving a boy who had been a bad
character. He was accused of a particular serious offense and was held
incommunicado by the police for four days, and was not allowed to see
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anybody; finally, a confession was obtained. The Appellate Division of
the Fourth Department reversed the finding of delinquency which followed. Therefore, perhaps it is still necessary for the courts to act in the
same manner that they have in the past.
For a moment, I want to leave this particular field, because I think
the law on the subject has been fully expounded, and go to an allied field
which Professor Sutherland touched upon in his reference to Mapp and
which is also, I think, of interest; namely, the question of state searches
and seizures. A rather anomalous result reached by the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Ker v. California [374 U.S. 23 (1963)]
deserves your attention.
Ker was a case in which the police entered an apartment by obtaining
a key from the superintendent, and found some narcotics. They, therefore, arrested the occupants. California law requires that the police, before
entering, announce their presence. The California courts, however, had
interpreted the statute as not covering the situation where to announce
might result in the destruction of the material which the police were
seeking, pointing out that one could easily dispose of something like
narcotics.
After California had upheld the conviction, the case went to the
United States Supreme Court. The court spit three ways. Four of the
Justices held that state seizures are subject to those decisions of the
United States Supreme Court in the field which rests on constitutional
principles, but not those decisions in the field which rests merely on the
Supreme Court's supervisory power over the federal courts. In other
words, the McNabb-Mallory rule, which the Court has never declared
to be one of constitutional stature, would not, in the area of search and
seizure, apply to the states. The opinion held that in this particular case
the search was not in violation of the constitutional principle.
Four other Justices argued, while agreeing with the basic position of
the first group, that a'violation of constitutional principles had taken
place. Mr. Justice Brennan was the spokesman for the group, this being
one of those rare civil liberties cases in which Justices Black and Douglas
were on opposite sides-Justice Black being in the first group, and Justice
Douglas in the second.
Justice Harlan took a different approach; he did not believe that the
Court should put state prosecutors under any general handicap, and that
the attempt to distinguish between what was and what was not a constitutional principle would only result in confusion. Therefore, he felt that
the Court should interfere only when there was, in effect, a shocking violation, as in the stomach pump case [Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
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(1952)]. So the situation is still not altogether clear as to what the Supreme Court will do, and when it will do it. However, Mapp evokes still
another problem-one which is, I imagine, troublesome to prosecutors all
over the country; the extent to which Mapp is going to be applied retroactively. There have been a number of cases of that kind. In the Hall
[Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963)] case the court of appeals
applied Mapp retroactively, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari;
but, other circuits' decisions have been contrary and have refused to apply
Mapp retroactively. (When I say retroactively, I mean to a case completely finished.) Mapp has been applied in a partially retroactively
manner to cases in which appeals were still pending at the time that Mapp
was decided. This has been based on the old theory that an appeal is
decided, on the basis of the law as it exists at the time of the decision, not
as it existed at the time of the trial. The extent, therefore, of retroactivity
is still unclear, because the denial of certiorari in the Hall case is, as you
all know, no indication that the Supreme Court necessarily approved the
result. I am inclined, however, to agree with Professor Sutherland that
the Supreme Court is likely to continue along its present course and make
it increasingly difficult to interrogate people and to convict them.
On the other hand, as Professor Wigmore said long ago in his very
interesting discussion of the privilege against self-incrimination, one of
the virtues of the privilege against self-incrimination is that it makes the
police dig, makes them do a lot of work in trying to obtain evidence which
otherwise they might not do. [8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2251 (McNaughton
ed. 1961)]. The police may not always be able to find pay dirt, but when
they do dig and find evidence, the likelihood of the conviction being
sustained, which is ultimately their objective, is much greater than if
they go off on dubious routes and ultimately find that their conviction is
reversed, and so much time has gone by that it may not be possible to
retry the particular defendant. After all, what society is interested in is
that people who are properly accused of crime should be convicted. The
police and prosecutors might, therefore, be better advised to concentrate
on the other evidence and not to be so keen on getting confessions under
circumstances of doubtful permanence.
COMMISSIONER MCCLELLAN: I am more and more impressed, as a
result of the talks this morning, and discussions which I had with a
number of people at the noon hour, with the differences in procedure
between Canada and the United States, stemming though, as we do, from
a common source of law.
I am also faced with a low, inside curve, from the good professor on my
right, when he tells me that the Judges' Rules, which have stood for some
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years, have been amended within the last three days. And if my inspector
in charge of the legal department of my force at home has learned within
the last twenty-four hours that he let me go without knowing it, he is
probably expecting a voluntary statement when I get home, which will be
perfectly admissible. However, I take refuge in the fact that the Canadian
courts have 'not considered themselves bound by the Judges' Rules and
I am sure that in a matter of three days they have had no opportunity
to rule. I am, therefore, fairly safe.
What is the real result of violating or disregarding the Judges' Rules?
As I explained this morning, the Judges' Rules are not law, neither common law nor legislation; and there are no sanctions, criminal or civil,
that can be supplied against a police officer for violation of the rules.
Bear in mind, I am talking about my own country. The Rules are for the
guidance of the police, and are in accordance with the law for the admissibility of statements and confessions made by accused persons. So, in
effect, the closer the adherence to the Judges' Rules, the better the chances
of having such a statement admitted.
Since the Boudreau [Boudreau v. The King, (1949) Can. Sup. Ct. 262,
[1949] 3 D.L.R. 81] case in 1949, the law in Canada has been clear with
respect to the admissibility of statements made by accused persons. The
Supreme Court of Canada in that case held that if a statement made by
an accused person was voluntarily given, that is, without inducement
through promise or threat, it was admissible. The question of whether it
was voluntarily given is one for the judge, and is a question of fact to be
decided by the judge after he has considered all the circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement.
Furthermore, the Crown must demonstrate that the statement was
voluntarily given; in other words, the onus is on the Crown to prove that
the statement was voluntary. To do this, the Crown and, therefore, the
police, must be prepared to give in evidence before the judge on the voir
dire all the circumstances surrounding the taking of that statement.
This is the area in which the Judges' Rules have application. For, as I
said, the judges were in effect saying: "take the statements this way, and
they will stand a better chance of being admitted."
We might observe that the judges in laying down the rules were acting
like solicitors giving advice to clients with respect to the application of
the law.
The Boudreau case in Canada is a good one to illustrate this point. In
that case the court was considering the effect of the caution to be given
by the police as advised in the Judges' Rules. In 1943, the Supreme Court
of Canada held, in the Gach [Gack v. The King, (1943) Can. Sup. Ct.
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250, [1943] 2 D.L.R. 417] case that when a person has been arrested,
all confessions made by him to a person in authority as a result of questioning, are inadmissible in evidence, unless a proper caution has been
given. The holding of that case obliterated forty-nine years of law. The
decision was not popular with the police and caused confusion; its effect
was categorically to make the admissibility of a confession dependent upon
whether the caution had been given; whereas, up to that time admissibility
of confessions and statements was determined by a consideration of all
the circumstances surrounding the taking of them.
In 1949, in the Boudreau case, the Supreme Court of Canada had another chance to look at this point and said:
It is not the law that a confession or an incriminating statement made by
a person in custody to a person in authority is necessarily inadmissible
against him unless preceded by a caution or warning. The controlling question, in all cases where confessions or incriminating statements of an accused
person are offered in evidence against him is whether they were freely and
voluntarily made, and the presence or absence of a warning is merely one
of the relevant considerations which in the light of all surrounding circumstances govern the exercise of the trial Judge's discretion on the issue of
voluntariness and hence, of inadmissibility. [Boudreau v. The King, (1949)
Can. Sup. Ct. 262, [1949] 3 D.L.R. 81] [unofficial summary].
So, in effect, the court is saying, failure to caution and, therefore, failure
to abide by the Judges' Rules, will not necessarily render a statement or
confession inadmissible, but will be considered by the judge on the question of admissibility. It is submitted that our courts have retained their
discretion to determine whether the statement is voluntary and do not
wish this question to depend upon a set of rules such as the Judges' Rules.
In the Boudreau case, Mr. Justice Rand said it would be a serious error
to place the ordinary modes of investigation in a strait jacket of artificial
rules; the true protection, he indicated, against improper interrogation
or any kind of pressure or inducement, is to leave the broad question to
the court. Rigid formulas can be both meaningless to the weakling and
absurd to the sophisticated or hardened criminal, and to introduce a new
right as an inflexible condition would serve no genuine interest of the
accused; to the contrary, it would add an unreal formalism to that vital
branch of the administration of justice.
I would submit this is the correct approach because the more rules we
have, the more difficult our job as police officers becomes. At the same
time, the onus is on the police to set a high standard of ethics, so that
their methods will not be questioned and result in restrictive legislation
aimed at undesirable police methods. The spirit which prompted the
Judges' Rules should still prevail. Note, I said "the spirit" which prompted
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them should still prevail; namely, a desire by the police to act properly
and in the spirit of law. Short cuts in abuse of their power by the police
can only result in restrictive legislation today. Unless we wish to make
our job even more difficult, we must maintain high standards of conduct
in our investigation and enforcement of the criminal law. We can question, interview persons, and obtain confessions from them, and providing
we act reasonably and honestly, such evidence will be fairly considered by
the courts. This is what we teach our men.
I suggest that the police should resist legislative and judicial attempts
to make rigid rules which unrealistically affect the outcome of prosecution
or the admissibility of evidence. This can only be done by maintenance
of a high standard of ethical conduct, and fairness in dealing with accused
persons. In doing so, we need not be soft, but fair and firm. The purpose
of any trial, theoretically at least, is to arrive at the truth. I am afraid
that all too often this procedure tends to prevent the jury from hearing
the truth. The laws of evidence exist to guard against untruthful evidence
and the police, providing they do not violate individual rights, must be
able to pursue the search for truth in any case. Undue restrictions on the
police in this pursuit tip the scales in favor of the accused or in favor of
the guilty, so that the police function to protect society from the criminal
is forestalled. The administration of justice and a criminal trial is not a
game being played by two counsels with the judge as a referee. I think
the words of Mr. Justice Riddle of the Ontario Court of Appeals in Rex
v. Charmondy [61 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 224, 225-26 (1934), [1938]
2 D.L.R. 48-49] are appropriate. He said:
[I]n disposing of this case, it would seem necessary to state once more
what a prosecution for alleged crime is considered to be in our jurisprudence. It is a solemn investigation by the State into the question of whether
the person charged has been "guilty of a certain specified offense against
the State, in which investigation the trial Judge and prosecuting counsel,
as officers of the State have their part to perform; a criminal prosecution
is not a contest between the state and the accused, in which the State seeks
a victory, but being an investigation, it is the duty of prosecuting counsel-as has been authoritatively laid down by this court-to lay all the
facts before the jury, those favorable to the accused as well as those unfavorable to him.
So, too, it is the duty of the Judge to guard the jury against considerations which the law forbids. He is also vested with the power and therefore the duty of seeing to it that the case is conducted upon the wellestablished principles of law.
View that in the light of the fact that under our procedure prosecuting
counsel does not take part in the investigation. He does not interview or
question the accused. He normally does not question witnesses, until such
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time as a charge has been laid. Even then I can't remember a case in
which prosecuting counsel ever interviewed the accused. He will interview
the witnesses before going to trial, in order to satisfy himself as to the
evidence. But, under our system, he is not part of the investigation. And
the rationale behind this is, of course, that being an officer of the court,
he should and must be in a completely impartial position.
The Judges' Rules are a sound approach in this area, and they are
followed by my own force with respect to advising the accused that he is
entitled to counsel or any of the other rights guaranteed to the accused
by law.
This approach depends upon the police maintaining a high standard of
conduct. In practice, these matters can be dealt with in instructions issued by the police in accordance with the applicable law or by judicial
authority. In short, it means that the police will respect the rights of the
individual without being compelled to do so by specific provisions of law
imposed on them. This approach is sound because it does not restrict
the police in carrying out their functions, and yet, it leaves the court free
to exercise its discretion in applying the substantive law. These instructions in the form of police regulations or rules must be rigidly enforced
by the police themselves in an administrative capacity with a view to
maintaining a high standard of conduct for police officers. The Human
Rights Commission of the United Nations is presently considering
whether an international code of ethics for the code of police should be
adopted. In April 1963 a seminar was held in Canberra, Australia, under
the auspices of the Human Rights Commission and was attended by
representatives from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Ceylon, and other
southern countries. Among other topics, the seminar considered the limits
of police powers to interrogate. The following is quoted from the transscript of their proceedings:
All participants agree that in the interest of maintaining peace and order in
society, to bring the real criminals and offenders of the law before the court
for trial, the police should be given as wide powers as possible to interrogate.
The seminar recognizes the difficulty of reconciling the desire to insure
that fetters did not prevent investigation of crime with the desire to protect
human rights. In the circumstances, the guiding rules cannot be left to
internal police rules, but there must also be rules from without, whether in
the form of Judges' Rules or legislative provisions.
In conclusion, if we, as peace officers, hope to have the courts accept
our statements that what we did was correct, that what we did was proper,
that what we did was within the law, we are going to have to create an
atmosphere of police investigation and police standards that, over the
long haul, will be of such a nature that the courts will realize that it is not
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the nature of a law enforcement organization to do anything which is improper.
PROFESSOR ROULSTON: It may be a matter of some effrontry for an
Australian to participate in the discussion, considering I come from a
long line of convicts. The one hundred and seventy-five years of Australian
history has been a history of the rehabilitation of the convict, because the
original Australian settlers were either convicted felons or the jailers of
convicted felons. Most of us who have managed to come some distance
from that situation may suggest that rehabilitation- and reformation are
possible, and if not wholly successful, at least worth trying.
As to the Australian position on admissibility of confessions, the High
Court of Australia, which operates as a unifying court of appeals for all
the Australian states has paid particular attention to this question and
has established some rather settled rules. The first rule is similar to the
Canadian rule concerning involuntary statements; namely, that any
statement which the court concludes is involuntary, is mandatorily excluded. The court has no discretion in relation to any statement which it
regards as involuntary.
The courts have further formulated a rather broad concept of what is
an involuntary statement. An involuntary, statement is interpreted as
meaning any statement made in circumstances in which the will of the
accused, for any reason, is overborne. It need not be a threat or an inducement or violence. If for any reason the will of the accused is overborne,
the statement is deemed to be involuntary and mandatorily inadmissible.
There has developed in recent years a further discretionary rule which
provides that even though the statement is otherwise voluntary, the trial
judge has discretion to exclude it if the statement is obtained in circumstances which are unfairly prejudicial to the accused; it is in this area
that the Judges' Rules play their part.
The Judges' Rules are not law in Australia and the courts have frequently admitted statements which are in violation of the Judges' Rules.
With equal frequency, they have, in their discretion, excluded statements
which have violated the Judges' Rules. It depends on the nature of the
violation. It is clear from the pronouncements of the High Court that
their formulation of the rule reflects a disapproval of violence, threats,
and unfair practices in interrogation.
Professor Sutherland and Professor Inbau spoke about the civil liberties binge that apparently the United States has been witnessing in recent
years. This.experience is not a novel one. In England, as early as 1852,
Baron Parke was prompted to make the comment that: "I confess that
I cannot look at the decisions without some shame when I consider what
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objections have prevailed to prevent the reception of confessions. I agree
that the rule has been extended too far and that justice and common sense
have too frequently been sacrificed at the shrine of mercy." I gather that
this view, a hundred years after its expression, is shared by a number of
people on this panel.
The Australian courts, in considering this, have drawn an interesting
distinction based on the intelligence of suspects; the High Court in a
decision in 1950 had this to say:
"The obligation resting upon police officers is to put all questions fairly and
to refrain from anything in the nature of a threat or any attempt to extort
an admission. But it is in the interest of the community that all crimes
should be fully investigated with the object of bringing malfactors to justice,
and such investigations must not be unduly hampered. Their object is to
clear the innocent as well as to establish the guilt of the offender. They must
be aimed at the ascertainment of the truth and must not be carried out with
the idea of manufacturing evidence or extorting some admission, and thereby securing a conviction. Upon the particular circumstances of each case
depends the answer to the question as to the admissibility of such evidence."
The court is being very cautious, very vague. But it does go on to say:
The uneducated, perhaps semi-literate man, who has a record and is suspected of some offence, may be practically helpless in the hands of an over
zealous police officer. The latter may be honest and sincere, but his position
of superiority is so great and overpowering, that a statement may be taken
which seems very damaging, but which is really unreliable. The case against
an accused person in such cases sometimes depends entirely on the statement made to the police. In such a case, it may well be that his statement,
if admitted, would prejudice him very unfairly. Such persons stand often in
great need of that protection which only an extremely vigilant court can
give them.'They provide the real justification for the existence of an ultimate
discretion as to the admission of confessional evidence. The duty of the
police officers to be scrupulously careful and fair, is not, of course, confined to such cases, but where intelligent persons are being questioned, with
regard, say, to a murder, the position cannot properly be approached from
quite the same point of view.
The minuteness of scrutiny which in the one case may be entirely appropriate, may in the other be entirely misplaced and tend only to a perversion of justice. Each case must, of course, depend upon its own circumstances considered in their entirety. [Rex v. Lee, 82 Commw. L.R. 133, 155,
159-60, (1950) Argus L.R. 518, 528, 530-31 quoting R. v. Jefferies, 47
N.S.W. St. 248, 311-12, 64 W.N.N.S.W. 71 (1947).]
It is interesting that the court recognizes the difference between an unintelligent, illiterate suspect and an intelligent one, and takes into consideration the gravity of the offense. The judicial attitude apparently is
that when the crime is a serious crime, the police are to be given more
liber.ty than in the situation where the crime is of a less serious nature.
On the other hand, the courts have taken the logically indefensible
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position concerning search and seizure cases. In Australia we have no
Bill of Rights, we have no written constitutional guarantees against unlawful searches and seizures. The courts have been content to follow the
English principle laid down in 1955 that evidence, whether obtained in an
illegal manner or not, is nevertheless admissible with two qualificationsone relating to confessions. The court has held that confessions are an
exception to the rules governing admissibility of the illegally obtained
evidence; the second exception concerns evidence obtained by "an unfair trick." The court does not spell out what is an unfair trick. Rather, it
seems to imply that some tricks are fair and other tricks are unfair; but
God help the poor police officer who looks to the court decisions in an
effort to decide when his tricks become unfair. That is where the position
illogically rests; namely, as far as confessions are concerned, the courts
have laid down rigid rules while, at the same time, holding that other illegally obtained evidence is admissible, provided the trickery involved is
not unfair.
I was interested in Professor Sutherland's information pertaining to the
changes in the Judges' Rules. I knew that the English judges were disturbed with the present operation of the Rules. I thought they may have
gone further in freeing the police officer from the rigid restrictions that
they themselves imposed upon him. As far as the Australian scene is concerned, I do not think that the changes in the Judges' Rules will have any
significant effect.
In Australia the arrested person must be taken, as soon as reasonably
practical, before a magistrate, where he is duly charged, the magistrate
determining whether he should be released on his own recognizance or
remanded for a later hearing. There are no restrictions on the police
power to interrogate the accused during the period of transportation to
the magistrate. This question arose in vivid form in the Bradley case, the
first kidnapping case to occur in Australia in which the suspect had taken
a ship intending to sail to England; however, he was arrested at Ceylon
and held in custody. Extradition proceedings were then taken. Two
Australian police officers flew to Ceylon and on the flight back, over the
Indian Ocean, the accused became extremely voluble and made a long
and lengthy confession.
The confession, however, in the view of the police was entirely untrue.
They therefore introduced the confession into evidence and they promptly
proceeded to demolish the confession in a number of significant particulars. There is no doubt that such a confession would have been admissible,
assuming that it was a voluntary statement, and that the suspect was not
threatened in the back of the aircraft.
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There is, however, in the Australian police force (I refer to the single
state forces of each of the six states) a practice to discourage reliance
upon confessions; the view is taken as a matter of training and as a matter
of policy that a confession is the most unreliable form of evidence. The
police are advised that wherever possible a confession should not form the
sole basis of the prosecution's case. However, similar to the Canadian
practice, we can use any leads which we obtain as a result of the confession, and in the stock formula, "acting on information received, I
proceeded in a northeasterly direction and apprehended the accused."
There is, in Australia, a genuine fear that undue reliance may be placed
on confessions to the exclusion of checking on further evidence.
I would like to make a few observations about law enforcement in the
United States. I cannot justify these remarks except by pointing out that
my only competence to even talk to you is that I have spent five months
in your country observing some large police departments in operation.
One factor that seems to me to be relevant is that only since about 1940
has the question of police lawlessness received intensive consideration.
The cases which led to the examination into police practices seem to me
to be cases in which the police excesses have been indefensible. It is not
the ordinary case that gets to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Rather, it is the exceptional case, the case involving the unusual deviation
from normality which are represented in those decisions. This has its
effect. People think that because this has happened, it always happens.
This, I would think, is partly due to what to me is a surprising feature of
American law enforcement-that is the fragmentation of your police
forces into so many individual forces. I would say that a consolidation of
forces, not necessarily even a state-wide consolidation, would help in
achieving uniform practices and in developing proper methods so that the
excesses are kept to a minimum.
The point to which Professor Sutherland adverted and with which I
am in complete agreement, is the need for public respect and cooperation,
which seems to me to be singularly lacking in many areas of your country.
Law enforcement cannot be effective unless you have public cooperation,
public support, and public respect for what the law enforcement officer is
doing. And unless you have at least general, even if not universal, respect, the process of law enforcement, to that extent, is going to be inefficient and ineffective.
Finally, one thing that has led to the observance of proper practices in
Australia is the very real threat that our police officer has of individual
civil responsibility for any excess. There is a real likelihood of the officer
being judged liable in substantial civil damages if he violates any of the
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normal legal protections given to the citizen. This threat of liability
operates to curb the over-zealous, over-new, over-sadistic police officer;
it operates to protect the police officer from unlawful superior commands.
For example, if his superior orders him to do an act which he knows, or
reasonably supposes, is unlawful-such as making an unlawful arrestthe officer can quite properly-and frequently does-say: "Do it yourself.
This is unlawful and if I do it, I am the one who is going to be subject to
civil liability." It works effectively. The majority of our police commissioners strongly support this notion of personal civil responsibility; the
members of the force feel that the individual officer has a civil liability
in the same way as any other citizen.
JuDGE MooiE: 16 You have all seen in the front of books that caveat
about any character in this book living or dead being entirely fictional. I
am going to take advantage of the same caveat; anything that I say is not
to be taken as a reflection of any thought that I might have while saying
it. This includes any thought that I might believe to be sound or any
thought or prophecy that I might make for the future, and if I have failed
to cover any possibility in that statement, I intend also by things unsaid
to cover it.
I, of course, disagree heartily with some of the theories that have been
expounded, but do not disagree with any of the problems which have been
put before you by such capable persons, who see them in the front lines.
I am not going to discuss whether we are in search of truth or whether it
is a game. For shock purposes, it might be said that from the moment the
crime has been committed, no one is interested in the truth. From that
time on, it's a game. Those discussions between defense counsel and
prosecutor as to how much a reduction in charge or what sentence can be
obtained for what kind of a plea, that is not truth; that's a game.
Truth, if we keep up, will be that undiscoverable factor which remains
solely in the recesses of the mind of the person accused of the crime, and
will never come out. And if I had to give advice to anyone, I would say:
16 Prefatory Note: For some time the Bench, the Bar, and law enforcement agencies have
had to cope with ever-changing concepts of constitutional rights. Over the past few decades,
there have been scores of decisions dealing with the safeguarding of the rights of individuals
accused of crime. This concentration is understandable and proper in a legal system which
assures to all the benefits bestowed by the federal constitution. As a result of the efforts of
dedicated members of the Bar, many persons hitherto deprived of these rights have been
able to secure them. At the same time, any society which probably owes its very existence to
"law and order" must give some concern to ways and means of securing and preserving this
status. Such a society must have properly functioning law enforcement agencies operating
under workable rules which endeavor to reconcile the sometimes conflicting interests of
society and the individual. Only by thoughtful attention by the courts, the Bar, and law
enforcement officers can these apparent conflicts be resolved with a resultant scheme which
will serve as a protection to all. The following remarks are intended possibly by the reductio
ad absurdum method to touch upon, and awaken an interest in, some of the problems which
often are created by the necessity of trying to have constitutional rights placed in the hands
of all; not merely a few.
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"If you are caught, immediately say to the arresting officer: you got me,
I done it, I'll tell you all," knowing full well that no conviction would
stand as a result, and although he might be temporarily inconvenienced by
a trial and in jail for a little while, eventually, he would go free.
After what you have heard, you probably want to hear a little bit about
the federal side of this question. We have in the books, even ad nauseum,
high sounding, pontifical statements, about the delicate balance between
state and federal relations. We always put that in, and then we proceed to
treat the trial in the state court as if it came from a state of the lowest
form of aborigines, where no concept of justice was ever heard of. We
delicately balance it by putting, not a pound of lead against a pound of
feathers, as we used to cope with in grammar school. We just put a fiveton truck on one side of the scale and we put one single feather on the
other.
To me, this presents an anomaly which I want to briefly review. We
have a trial in the state court. Let's assume it's a civilized state. And there
are twelve people who sit in two rows of six each. About 1215 A.D., King
John and some of his successors, forced to be sure, thought it would be a
good idea to have those twelve people pass upon their fellow man as to
their guilt or innocence. You have all seen the twelve people sitting there,
and if you wonder what they are doing, they are there to listen and pass
upon the fate of this particular person. He has his counsel, and they go at
it, fair and square. In New York, which is really more than a semi-civilized
state, we have an appellate division so all of the errors that have been
committed by the scorer go before the appellate division and are considered. But we do not stop there. We even have a third round in the
Court of Appeals and those seven gentlemen hear and weigh, and let us
assume, as we certainly should in this now highly civilized State of New
York, that they really do read the record, and they have consciences, and
they consider the welfare of the defendants, rich and poor, despite words
to the contrary which have been written in some of the books.
Here is where the great anomaly comes, in my opinion. The accused
petitions for certiorari. Now, I don't know exactly what that means. I
taught Latin in college for a couple of years, but it's a big Latin word,
and it means to the prisoner that he wants "out." But I guess that is a
free Latin translation. It means he kind of wants the other fellows to take
a look at the situation. So they pack up all the volumes of testimony and
the briefs and they send them down to some place to the south of us,
about two hundred odd miles, to have nine gentlemen look at it. They
read it very carefully, because all the error, all the injustice of the case is
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set forth, and after they see how unjust it is, they say, we don't want to
do anything about it.
So, up in Attica or Dannemora, or wherever the fellows go, while they
are working away on the rock pile, one morning somebody says: "Say,
Joe". (this is ten o'clock in the morning, Monday) "they tell me at noon
the Supreme Court is going to hand down a decision that will get us out
of here." And sure enough-the reason I am not expounding any law, is
first, because I have a profound conviction that no sitting judge should
write for publication on any legal subject or in public speak on any subjects where he might in any way reveal his views, except as he speaks
entirely in a hypothetical way with a caveat given to his audience before
he so speaks, and then follows it by saying, it is as if he were talking about
Alice in Wonderland in the law.
So Joe says: "Well, now, what are we going to do about it? We don't
like this rock breaking too much. They tell me that you can get two hours
off everyday to go in the library of the prison," which is filled with
the charming young
Queen's Bench Reports from Elizabeth I-not
lady who is there now-and all the reports right down through the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, which have high sounding
expressions about liberty and all that sort of thing that Mr. Fraenkel
knows so much better than I do. So two hours off a day to work on this
petition. Then they hire a fellow who writes, as we say in Brooklyn,
"pretty good." So they say: "Mike, we'll give you such and such if you
will write this up longhand with six carbons." I always get the fifth.
They send that in and then they hope that they will get another day
off by being allowed to petition for habeas corpus. They get a day off and
they come down to some other city, like Syracuse, or Utica and they say
that they should not be in jail. Mind you, three hearings in state courts
of the finest state in the country and a denial of certiorari has already
taken place. As I see the law today on a habeas corpus petition that person
can get an entirely new trial of all the issues on the merits, on the redeal,
after a preview in three state courts and one other, and review all the
mistakes that allegedly have been made-and now they have even added
a new wrinkle, that counsel was incompetent.
Of course, he was incompetent. The fellow was convicted. How could
he have been otherwise. Competent counsel has to be brought into the
picture. But we have to get counsel to discover just how incompetent the
other counsel originally had been. So the court will appoint counsel for
that purpose.
And another bit of pontification-I have forgotten whether I wrote in
Rodgers v. Richmond [271 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1959), rev'd, 365 U.S. 534
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(1961)] or not. If I were to say that it was just one of my many reversals,
you could easily understand why I do not remember which one of the
many it was. But if I did not write it, I certainly participated in it and
I remember exactly how the fellow was picked up in New Haven, and
taken here, there, and the other place.
What I am thinking about is our distinguished professor's namesake, the
justice. The guiding hand of counsel at all times. Let us see what that
means. A criminal at all times needs counsel. There is a book in this
state, I discovered it the other day, which has a black cover, written by
a fellow named McKinney. It's all full of crimes. Amazing, how he got
them all in one book. Crimes, first degree, second degree, third degree,
fourth degree, and he tells you right in the rule book exactly what you
have to pay for every crime. It's fascinating. It starts with an assault at
"A" and goes right down the list, and you can see whether it's more
convenient to you to commit robbery or to commit rape.
But the time you need counsel is before you go out to commit the
crime, because counsel will tell you which of those degrees is the least
risky and which has the best penalty if you get caught. Is there any time
in a criminal's career where counsel is more essential than at that stage?
You, see the trouble with all of this nonsense, this hypothetical Alice in
Wonderland business that I am giving you, is that it is utter nonsense to
anybody that wants to be seribus. But lets take it one step beyond the
commission of the crime. And the fellow is running down the street and
the policeman is after him. Finally the policeman catches up with him. The
fellow says: "You can't arrest me. I haven't got a lawyer. Go out and get
me a lawyer." The policeman says: "I am so sorry to have interrupted
you. You are quite right. I did not see you commit the crime. There is a
real question as to whether there is reasonable cause for this arrest. You
are certainly entitled to advice of counsel on that subject. You just wait
here on the corner of 138th Street until I go and get you a lawyer. I'll be
back in a couple of hours, and you be here" and off he goes.
That is the second step. He has committed the crime and he has been
apprehended. They can't find a lawyer, so they take him somewhere'down
town, in federal practice, probably to some federal agency. After arraignment I guess he goes to the United States Attorney's office, to have a bit
of a chat with them, just to make sure they haven't got the wrong man.
After all, the search for truth is not a game at that stage. We all believe
the truth is an important part in this procedure.
So he doesn't have any counsel at that time. He is asked: "You want a
lawyer?" "No, I don't want a lawyer. You got me." How can he possibly
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say that? He does not know. He is a poor, uneducated fellow that has not
gone beyond third grade in grammar school. He is underprivileged. He
needs a lawyer to tell him that he doesn't need a lawyer. It's perfectly
simple, because his I.Q. is only 74-that all comes out later in the habeas
corpus proceeding-and I understand that you don't even begin to be a
moron until you are up to 75. This fellow was only 74. But this hypothetical prisoner has heard that all the judges give you a real break if you
plead guilty and do not cause expense and waste the time of a trial. So
he decides that he will plead guilty. Of course, he couldn't possibly do
that without the advice of counsel. Therefore, they finally get him counsel
and counsel says: "Yes, this is a pretty good idea, you had better plead
guilty."
He pleads guilty. You see, that isn't very good advice at all so it comes
up in habeas corpus.
I have tried at least to outline some of the problems. I said I would not
give you any of the answers. I will. I will give you the answer to the whole
business, it is quite simple. We will, beginning March 1, issue an order
to every warden of every penitentiary in every state to release every
prisoner. Six months later, we will start all over again. During those six
months the courts will formulate a set of rules for both teams. None of
this business about running down the field for a touchdown and when the
fellow gets on the five-yard line, about to go over, the referee shouts:
"Oh, by the way, that only counts 3 instead of 6 points." Considering the
American public as a group of spectators at a football game, they wouldn't
stand for such treatment. Whether it be Yale, Harvard, or just a professional game, you cannot change the rules while the ball is being carried. I
would then have the courts formulate these rules for both teams. I would
have them send a copy of the rules to every prosecutor. You see, the
six months out of there would give them quite a lot of opportunity to do
a good deal of activity in their own field, so we would have a lot of crimes
to be solved. But we would not overcrowd the jails, because if we were
to release a hundred thousand prisoners, under the new rules, you could
not convict more than five thousand, and that would save the budgets of
all the states. It would save them from building new jails and possibly
even the national debt could be balanced. All sorts of possibilities there.
But doesn't it make sense to be serious for a moment? Doesn't it make
sense to try to have some kind of a set of rules that can be followed by
both sides? No matter what you say today, we get all snarled up in
trying to say what is probable cause, reasonable grounds. The books
are full, the decisions are still coming down day after day. As I say,
every Tuesday morning's New York Times will carry new decisions
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and new rules. If we are going to cast aside Betts v. Brady [316 U.S. 455
(1942)] and say that it is overruled or that the rules of reasonable cause,
the rule of reason, and the rule of unfairness are to be cast aside, then
let us substitute some kind of a rule that we will have to go by, instead of
what I regard as law enforcement uncertainty at the present time.

